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ABSTRACT
There is much debate among genocide scholars as to the causes and even accurate
definitions of genocide. Early warning developed to address the increasing need for
humanitarian intervention in violent conflicts around the world. As a subset of genocide
studies, early warning seeks to go beyond explaining the causes of genocide. The early
warning model created here uses six indicator variables—government, leaders/elites,
followers, non-followers/bystanders, outsider group, and environment—to detect the
likelihood of genocide within a given case study. Four cases were chosen—Kenya,
Nigeria, Yemen, and Ethiopia—and analyzed using the indicator variables to determine if
these violent conflicts may already be or may become genocides. Preliminary findings
show that the civilian outsider group is a vital component when determining whether or
not a conflict is or may become a “limited-genocide” and that genocides are a function of
the interaction of the six indicator variables and not just their presence. Other
implications for sovereignty and humanitarian intervention are discussed.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

There can be no more important issue, and no more binding obligation, than the
prevention of genocide. Indeed, this may be considered one of the original
purposes of the United Nations. The “untold sorrow” which the scourge of war
had brought to mankind, at the time when our Organization was established,
included genocide on a horrific scale. The words “never again” were on
everyone’s lips…and yet, genocide has happened again, in our time. (Former UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 2004).

The concept of genocide itself is not very clear, even though many scholars have
been researching for years to define it and to determine its characteristics. These words
by Kofi Annan express the current state of the international community where genocides
still occur; despite our acknowledgement of what the consequences are should there be a
failure to prevent them. This uncertainty of the concept of genocide, and even a
consensus on one definition, helps to hinder attempts at prevention by institutions such as
the United Nations.
Many of the problems with defining genocide come from the single-shot case
study method used by most genocide scholars, where the scholars tend to treat each case
as unique or they do not compare one case of genocide to any others. Furthermore, with
this case study method, variables are not derived until after the case has been analyzed.
This paper analyzes each case with six variables that have already been determined by
building upon previous research from genocide scholars and leadership studies to create a
more comprehensive, integrated model. Instead of waiting to call organized violence
genocide until it looks like a “classic genocide,” this model contains factors which could
lead to genocide predicting instead of “post-dicting.” By focusing on pinning down all
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the components of a classic genocide before a case of violence perpetrated by the state is
called genocide by the international community, it hinders humanitarian intervention.
The research motivation for this paper was to create model which contains a
better framework and more definitive indicator variables. With a stronger framework, this
model could be used as justification for humanitarian intervention by different parties in
the international community.
As it stands today, there is only one model, developed by Barbara Harff (2003)
(See APPENDIX A: GENOCIDE RISK ASSESSMENT MODEL), which is generally
accepted as the best currently for potential risk assessment of genocides. This model was
built upon post-dicting genocides and politicides after analyzing past cases of organized
violence; however, Harff has only tested one case to use her model to predict a genocide.
Given the multitude of issues and concepts in this paper, it is important to
understand how they are all connected and play a part in and around genocide. This paper
proceeds with an overview of the United Nations Genocide Convention and relevant
research by noted genocide scholars from its inception. Second, it discusses the
implications of international relations theory and humanitarian intervention as it applies
to genocide and the prosecution of genocidaires, perpetrators of genocide. Third, it
describes previous and current genocide early warning models for a broader
understanding of the model used in this paper. Fourth, the case study methodology is
discussed pertaining to other genocide case study methodologies as well as the
methodology used in this paper. Fifth, this paper uses the early warning model created to
analyze selected cases of violent conflict for the likelihood that the case is or is not a
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genocide. This paper concludes with a discussion of the findings from the case studies
and future research to consider.

Genocide Research and Definitions

The major breakthrough in international humanitarian law was the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which was drafted on December 9,
1948 and entered into force on January 12, 1951 (United Nations, 2010). As of January 1,
2010, there were 141 states party to the Convention (United Nations, 2010). The
Convention (United Nations, 2010) defines genocide as any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such:
a) Killing members of a group;
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

With a large contribution from Raphael Lemkin in coining the term "genocide" and
creating a definition, the Convention established genocide as being punishable under law.
Furthermore, Lemkin sought to differentiate genocide from the act of war when he stated
"the Rousseau-Portalis Doctrine... holds that war is directed against sovereigns and
armies and not against subjects and civilians" (Shaw, 2007, p. 25). Shaw (2007) agrees
that it is this key distinction that identifies genocide as criminally distinct from war.
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The main critique of this definition listed by scholars is that it excludes other groups
defined along class and political lines, which as one can see, were often the victims of
genocides after the Holocaust. Other critiques are conveyed by Andreopoulos (1994)
where he says "the exact meaning of the intentionality clause in the Convention... and the
absence of an international enforcement mechanism in the form of an international penal
tribunal that would punish the perpetrators of genocidal activities" (p. 3). The absence of
international penal tribunals Andreopoulos mentions is due to the time of his writing; the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established in
1993 and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established late in 1994.
Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity (2010), the digest of the case of
law of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), has helped to reconcile the
uncertainty about establishing intent around charges of genocide. This tribunal helped to
decide that “genocidal intent could be determined from the widespread and systematic
patterns of violence directed against the Tutsi population” (Alvarez, 2010, p. 20). The
ICTR digest states that the specific intent of genocide may be inferred from certain facts
but not limited to:
(a) the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically
directed against that same group…(b) the scale of atrocities committed, (c) their
general nature, (d) their execution in a region or country, (e) the fact that the victims
were deliberately and systematically chose on account of their membership of a
particular group, (f) the exclusion, of members of other groups, (g) the political
doctrine which gave rise to the acts referred to, (h) the repetition of destructive and
discriminatory acts and (i) the perpetration of acts which violate the very foundation
of the group or considered as such by their perpetrators (p. 20).
This tribunal has helped to establish what genocidal intent actually looks like as well
as founding a legal basis for genocidal intent. The International Criminal Tribunal for the
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former Yugoslavia dealt more with the issue of ethnic cleansing rather than genocide
directly and it also did not establish the detail that the ICTR has for criminal prosecution
(Tournaye, 2003). The International Court of Justice, in the case of Bosnia v. Serbia,
illustrated that intent could be determined in three ways: “through individual perpetrators,
through a comprehensive plan, and through a consistent pattern of action” (Alvarez,
2010, p. 20).
In addition, to outlining specific details for what constitutes intent, the ICTR digest
(2010) has also outlined what circumstances could be used in the absence of direct
evidence:
The overall context in which the crime occurred; the systematic targeting of the
victims on account of their membership in a protected group; the fact that the
perpetrator may have targeted the same group during the commission of other
criminal acts; the scale and scope of the atrocities committed; the frequency of
destructive and discriminatory acts, whether the perpetrator acted on the basis of the
victim’s membership in a protected group (p. 21).
By instituting precedent with direct and indirect evidence of genocide in Rwanda, the
ICTR digest has been able to mitigate much of the confusion that has surrounded
establishing the criminality of genocidal intent as well as establishing legal precedents for
possible cases in the future.
Working without the legal precedents found in the ICTR digest, genocide scholars
after Lemkin have worked on several other important questions surrounding the topic of
genocide and many of them have found some very interesting results and conclusions.
Helen Fein, a noted genocide scholar, developed her own definition of genocide. Her
definition holds that genocide is the "sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to
physically destroy a collective directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological
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and social reproduction of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack
of threat offered by the victim" (Alvarez, 2010, p. 23). Fein also recognizes the
limitations of the Convention's definition but hers seems to be too broad and might begin
to include other crimes against humanity. Fein also works through the problem with the
ambiguity of the intentionality clause, seen by many other scholars to be one of the main
problems with prosecuting genocide, by proposing a paradigm that lists specific
conditions that she believes are explicit for genocide to occur (Andreopoulos, 1994).
Examples include, “a sustained attack or continuity of attacks by the perpetrator to
physically destroy group members,” “the victims were defenseless or were killed
regardless of whether they surrendered or resisted,” and “the destruction of group
members was undertaken with intent to kill and murder as sanctioned by the perpetrator”
(Andreopoulos, 1994, p. 5). She has also developed a typology that identifies four kinds
of genocide:
1) Developmental, in which the perpetrator intentionally or unintentionally
destroys peoples who stand in the way of the economic exploitation of
resources
2) Despotic, which are designed to eliminate a real or potential opposition, as
in a new, highly polarized, multi ethnic state
3) Retributive, in which the perpetrator seeks to destroy a real opponent
4) Ideological, a category embracing cases of genocide against groups cast as
enemies by the state's hegemonic myth or by its need to destroy victims
who can be portrayed as the embodiment of absolute evil (Chalk and
Jonassohn, 1990, p. 15)

Christian Scherrer (1999) has also developed a typology of genocide in which he
lists genocides as either domestic, intra-state, foreign, colonial and imperialist. He further
differentiates domestic and foreign by state actors and non-state actors as well as listing
that a genocide could be a full-scale genocide, a partial genocide or mass murder. He also
6

discusses the structural situations which help define what each of the categories look like.
He refers to mass murder or massacres as "genocidal acts committed by different types of
perpetrators such as state agents or entire agencies, political extremists and interest
groups against vulnerable groups who have been excluded from main-stream society”
(Scherrer, 1999, p.15). He defines modern genocide as "state-organized mass murder and
crimes against humanity characterized by the intention of the rulers to exterminate
individuals for belonging to a particular national, ethnic, religious, or racial group"
(Scherrer, 1999, p. 15). Furthermore, his typology, although largely unknown, could be
perceived as becoming more appropriate for today's world due to the increase in non-state
actor influences and actions around the world.
Eric Weitz (2003) also agrees with Fein that the intention of the genocide is what
"distinguishes genocides from civilian casualties that may occur in wartime, from
pogroms, from massacres, from forced deportations-even if the number of victims is
massive" (p. 9). His book A Century of Genocide (2003) examines the high profile cases
of the twentieth century. He has found that many of them contain similarities such as
"their determination to remake fundamentally the societies and states they had either
conquered or inherited... and their goals entailed much more than the establishment of
new political elites or the creation of state-run industries and collectivized farms" (p.
237).
Gellately and Kiernan (2003) also understand the substantial limitations of the
Convention's genocide definition but they attribute the deficiencies to its composition
right after the Holocaust and would therefore contain all the elements of what happened
during that time. Lemkin had wanted to criminalize and prosecute what he described as
7

“the criminal intent to destroy or to cripple permanently a human group" and therefore
the Holocaust was the prime example the world could not deny (Gellately and Kiernan,
2003, p. 6). It is interesting to note that charges of actual "genocide" were not brought up
until years later, as the Nuremberg trials dealt with war crimes and crimes against
humanity (Gellately and Kiernan, 2003, p. 6).
Israel Charny, a noted Holocaust researcher, contributed greatly to the field of
genocide studies with his two volume compendium The Encyclopedia of Genocide
(1999), which serves as a comprehensive reference source for information on genocides
as well as comparative genocide studies.
He endeavored to compose a generic definition of genocide that would be
compatible with its everyday usage as well as closing the gap between "the reality of
masses of dead people and our legal-scholarly definition" (Andreopoulos, 1994). His
generic definition of genocide is "the mass killing of substantial numbers of human
being, when not in the course of military action against the military forces of an avowed
enemy, under conditions of the essential defenselessness and helplessness of the victims"
(Charny, 1999, p. 14). This definition is vastly different from the humanistic one he
proposed years earlier in which genocide is define as "the wanton murder of a group of
human beings basis of any identity whatsoever that they share national, ethnic, religious,
political, geographical, ideological" (Andreopoulos, 1994). This second definition
actually seems to be the broader and more generic definition that Charny was looking for,
as it would include the aspects that the Convention genocide was missing in addition to
all the types of groups that have been targeted in past genocides.
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Another scholar, Martin Shaw (2009) recognizes that wars and genocides might
be interrelated. His definition states genocide is "a type of conflict characterized by the
projection of power by an armed organization against a civilian population" (p. 103).
Shaw argues that past research has missed the “civilian” aspect of genocide. Other types
of conflict such as terrorism involve "a contest between organized armed actors
(typically, insurgent groups versus states)" and revolutions involve "contests between
politically organized social movements and states, typically leading to armed contests
between revolutionary parties and states (and hence civil wars)" (Shaw, 2009, p. 102). It
is this civilian distinction that excludes the other types of organized violence and narrows
it down to state perpetrated against its helpless civilian population, which is genocide.
Eck and Hultman’s (2007) research also helps to support Shaw's findings as it
shows that the majority of attacks on civilians occur during armed conflicts. Furthermore,
they found that about 89% of one-sided violence was perpetrated by the government.
This also ties into another significant trend presented in their research as autocratic
regimes are more likely to kill civilians in armed conflict than democracies are. This
research indicates that failed democracies and autocratic regimes should be under more
scrutiny by the international community as they are more likely to commit genocide as
well as crime against humanity.
Another genocide scholar worth mentioning for this research is Rudolph J.
Rummel. He uses a term he created, "democide," to include both genocides and
politicides (Rummel, 1995). By democide he means "the intentionally killing of people
by government” (Rummel, 1995, p. 4). Similar to his democratic peace theory, Rummel
(1995) states that power "should be directly predictive of democide such that the less
9

democratic a regime along the democratic to totalitarian scale of power, the more likely it
will commit democide" (p. 5). This finding had the unique characteristic of helping lay
the foundation for later genocide scholars to begin modeling with the type of government
as one of their independent variables.
This trend is also supported by Woolf and Hulsizer (2005) where they stipulate
that a distinctive part of genocidal states is the presence of a totalitarian leader and an
authoritarian form of government. Furthermore, they articulate that authoritarian leaders
will work to maintain their roles by creating a destructive culture and infrastructure as
well as promoting destructive ideologies within their cultures where "such ideologies
often are presented as moral, highly idealistic and for the greater good" (p. 107). Another
important aspect of their research is that they look at leadership success coupled with
genocide and recognize that genocidal leaders have many of the same characteristics,
such as "charisma, a desire for power and dominance, self-confidence, self-direction,
morality (and on the flip side, immorality) and intelligence" (p. 107). Leadership studies
and genocide is an area of genocide studies that is greatly lacking and may yield
interesting results regarding leaders and the mobilization of populations.
Aydin and Gates (2007) also explore the authoritarian leader and genocide aspect
where they find that "mass killing may become a tool for political survival in polities that
do not limit the decision-making power of the executive" (p. 21). In addition, they
unearth a trend where, looking at the distribution of mass killings on executive
constraints, "most regimes where geno/politicides have occurred, institutional check on
political power are substantially limited" (p. 21). This element of genocide that Aydin
and Gates have empirically tested might prove to be very important for understanding the
10

origins of genocide that have previously gone undetected. This characteristic is also
included in the conceptual framework used in this paper.
Although little known in genocide academia, Gregory Stanton, President of
genocidewatch.org, was an early contributor to the Genocide Studies Program at Yale
University when he created his 8 Stages of Genocide (Stanton, 1998). Stage one begins
with the classification of groups into an "us" and "them" mentality; stage two is where
symbols are used to describe people within specific groups; stage three is the
dehumanization of one group by another and that group is often equated with animals,
diseases or insects; stage four begins with the organization and training of militias and
plans are made for genocidal killings; stage five contains the polarization of groups by
extremists or hate groups who use propaganda or even laws to drive groups apart; stage
six begins with the preparation for killing as the victims are identified and segregated
from the rest of the population; stage seven starts with the extermination of the victims by
the state, or, as Stanton recognizes, by the revenge killings of groups against each other;
the eighth and final stage "always follows a genocide" as it is the denial of the events that
occurred (Stanton, 1998).
It is not hard to see that these eight stages of genocide were modeled after the
Holocaust. It is either a strength if one views the Holocaust as the epitome of what makes
a genocide or a weakness if one views the Holocaust as a unique and extreme example of
genocide.
Another noted genocide scholar, Barbara Harff (1988, 1998, 2003), has
contributed greatly to the field of genocide studies as well as early warning.
Harff (2003) defines genocide as:
11

the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by
governing elites or their agents- or, in the case of civil war, either of the
contending authorities-that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal,
political, or politicized ethnic group (p. 58).
This definition improves upon the 1948 UN Genocide Convention definition by
including the political groups, as well as a better vocabulary for what the intent to commit
genocide means. Similar to all the other definitions listed, it does not address the different
components that encompass a genocide and therefore is lacking in validity regarding the
concept of genocide.
Her most significant involvement with genocide studies has been working on
extending the principle of humanitarian intervention into cases of genocide. She believes
that genocide is a recurring event, with her latest early warning model (2003) (Jacobs and
Totten, 2002) and a detail discussion of her contribution to genocide studies and early
warning will be addressed in the Early Warning section.
Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn (1990) are two other noted genocide scholars.
They maintain that genocide is "a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other
authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by
the perpetrator" (p. 23). This definition's ingenuity comes from its simplicity in that it
does not bother with listing all the types of groups a possible genocide could target, as
seen in many other definitions, which becomes a problem as groups are unintentionally
overlooked. The most significant part of this definition is that it leaves the targeted
group's identity completely up to the perpetrators and thus helps to further show the
irrationality of genocidal intentions by the mere fact that a group could be made up of
whomever the genocide leader feels is a threat to their agenda. This definition is also
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similar the United Nations Genocide Convention in that it includes the concept of “intend
to destroy,” which Lemkin saw as a key distinction between genocide and war. This is
also the definition of genocide that will be employed throughout this paper.
Furthermore, Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) also developed a typology of genocide
in which they classify genocides according to their motives: “(1) to eliminate a real or
potential threat; (2) to spread terror among real or potential enemies; (3) to acquire
economic wealth; (4) to implement a belief, a theory, or an ideology” (p. 29).
It is worth discussing how genocide is different from other forms of organized
violence. Shaw (2009) cites Clausewitz’s view of war as “a type of action carried out by
a single (but of course collective) actor, and a type of conflict between two (or more)
actors, in which the action of each is conditioned by that of the other” (p. 101).
Revolutions are “mass social upheavals of largely unarmed civilian populations seeking
social and political transformation, although they also involve revolutionary parties and
organizations which are sometimes, to a greater or lesser extent, armed organizations”
(Shaw, 2009, p. 102). Terrorism involves “terrorizing civilian populations, usually
through publicized killings of a number of civilians, so as to produce political effects”
and can therefore be understood the warfare of the militarily weak (Shaw, 2009, p. 102).
Shaw views genocide as “a deviant form of war, involving a clash between armed power
and unarmed civilian, which often occurs in the context of more conventional war and
sometimes leads to new phases of it” (p. 103). It was this view that led him to formulate
his definition as previously stated.
Other definitions to consider are ethnic cleansing and genocidal massacres. As
stated above, Scherrer refers to “mass murder or massacres” as “genocidal acts
13

committed by different types of perpetrators such as state agents” (Scherrer, 1999, p.15).
Ethnic cleansing is defined by the UN Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 780, as “rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using
force or intimidation to remove from a given area persons of another ethnic or religious
group” (Hayden, 1996, p. 732). Genocidal massacre is an emerging term that is used to
describe massacres “that are not part of a continuous genocide but are committed by an
authority or other organized group against a particular ethnic or other distinguishable
group” (Charny, 1999, p. 248). This term “genocidal massacre” seems to merge how
Scherrer operationally defines mass murder and organized state violence that may or may
not reach the levels of what might be considered a genocide by the international
community.

Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention

Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the international community has operated
under the concept of sovereignty whereby each state has supreme authority within its
borders, as recognized by the rest of the international community. This concept is also in
line with classical realist principles where the world exists in a state of anarchy and the
state is the highest unit in international relations. Although we have supranational entities
such as the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, it is still up the each
individual nation-state to choose to become a part of that entity or not. Neoliberal
institutionalism would have each state choose to give up a portion of their sovereignty in
order to maximize the absolute gains for all states involved. An in depth look at the case
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of the Darfur region in Sudan is used as an example to show where early warning and
humanitarian intervention would have been the best course of action as well as to
demonstrate how the principles of neoliberal institutionalism are trying very
unsuccessfully to operate in a world ruled by classical realism.
Previously, humanitarian interventions were not attempted for the simple fact that
states were afraid to violate the sovereignty of another nation-state and risk the possibility
of a war. In today’s world, that is not the case; many states do not want to be financially
responsible for the humanitarian intervention if it is not directly affecting their interests.
With the projection of power that modern technology has made possible and even the
pretext of the United Nations, a coalition of sorts, it would be completely irrational for
the impacted state to retaliate against all those states involved. This is not saying that the
proximal states who may lend a hand would not be adversely affected; this would only
lead to further intervention on behalf of those states and again this is an unlikely scenario.
Matthew Krain (2005) has demonstrated empirical evidence on international
intervention reducing the severity of genocides and politicides. He tested a handful of
intervention models and determined which could reduce the magnitude of severity of
genocides or politicides. He uses an 11-point magnitude scale created by the State Failure
Task Force where they list a magnitude 0.0 as less than 300 deaths per year; a level 3.0 to
be 16,000-32,000 deaths; and a level 5.0 to be over 256,000 deaths (p. 375). The scale
was abbreviated in this paper for the purpose of conciseness.
The Impartial Intervention model is the thinking behind peacekeeping operations
where they appear “legitimate, unbiased, and non-threatening” (Krain, 2005, p. 367). He
found no statistically significant evidence for this model where it would affect the
15

severity of genocides or politicides. Unfortunately, this helps to confirm the “recent
conventional wisdom regarding the ineffectiveness of UN and other impartial
interventions” (p. 378). In addition, his Threat-Based model which policy holders have
supported in that an intervention might escalate rather than reduce the severity of
genocides and politicides is also unfounded this model was tested and found to be
statistically insignificant in escalation (p. 380).
Of the six models he tested, the only one that was statistically significant was an
overt military intervention aimed at stopping the perpetrator and this had a p-value <.01
(Krain, 2005, p. 379). He also found:
When a single international actor challenges the perpetrator, the predicted
probability that the killings will escalate drops from 0.6422 to 0.5510, while the
probability that the killings will escalate drops from 0.6422 to 0.5510, while the
probability that the killings will decrease jumps from 0.2836 to 0.3664. If two
actors challenge the perpetrator, the probability of escalation drops further to
0.4564, while the probability that the killings will abate increases to 0.4580. Three
challenging interventions increase the probability of lives saved from 0.2836 to
0.5527 (p. 380-381).
He also tested the probabilities of overt military intervention with the case of
Darfur and found that if a single actor had challenged al-Bashir, it most likely would have
reduced the probability of escalation from 0.6410 to 0.5499 and the probability that the
killings would have also decreased from 0.2120 to 0.2823 (p. 282). These findings are
extraordinary in that even one military intervention can drastically reduce the number of
lives lost. It also shows that multiple actors challenging a genocidal perpetrator, such as
the United Nations backed coalition; it would significantly help the situation.
The international relations theory that supports the use of supranational entities is
that of neoliberal institutionalism. This theory mainly focuses on institutions, as defined
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by Keohane (1988) where “institution” refers to “a general patter or categorization of
activity to a particular human-constructed arrangement, formally or informally
organized.” (p. 383). Neoliberal institutionalism subscribes to some of the classical realist
principles. The first is that states are the main actors in the international arena but
neoliberal institutionalism also understands that non-state actors play a significant role in
international relations as well (Baylis et al., 2008, p. 132). Secondly, neoliberal
institutionalists acknowledge that anarchy exists in the international arena but they also
see that states will be rational in that they will see the value in cooperation as possible
through institutions (Baylis et al., 2008, p. 132). In addition, the goal of neoliberal
institutionalism is to maximize absolute gains, as opposed to relative gains, through this
cooperation and where it is also easier to achieve in areas of mutual interest (Baylis et al.,
2008, p. 132). Neoliberal institutionalism also understands the importance of sovereignty
but when it comes to cooperation through institutions, states have to surrender some of
their sovereignty to “create integrated growth or to respond to regional problems” which
helps to reinforce to the notion that survival is not the only interest of the state according
to neoliberal institutionalists (Baylis et al., 2008, p. 132). This part is key to
understanding the concept of humanitarian intervention.
A principle not related to classical realism holds that “states and other actors can
be persuaded to cooperate if they are convinced that all states will comply with rules and
cooperation will result in absolute gains” (Baylis et al., 2008, p. 132). Furthermore,
institutions are the mediators and the means to achieve cooperation but the greatest
obstacle to neoliberal institutionalism is the non-compliance or cheating by states.
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The most prominent case of that ties the international relations theories with that
of humanitarian intervention is the genocide in Darfur, Sudan. This case was not studied
for the reason that many third parties in the international arena have already labeled it a
genocide and the aim of this paper is not to reiterate previous research. This case is
appropriate to show the need for humanitarian intervention as well as prosecution and
accountability for perpetrators of genocide.
On July 14, 2008, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the Prosecutor for the International
Criminal Court (ICC), indicted and applied for the arrest warrant against President Omar
al-Bashir of Sudan. The charges included five counts of crimes against humanity for
murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture, and rape; two counts of war crimes for
“intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population as such or against individual
civilians not taking part in hostilities…and pillaging” (ICC, 2009).
The events used as evidence for the indictment and warrant began in March 2003
but conflict and strife has been present in the area for much longer. Darfur, a region that
lies between Sudan and Chad, experienced trouble during the 1980’s from a civil war in
Chad that spilled over into the territory as well as problems later on in the 1990’s from
Chadian Arab groups trying to seize land (De Waal 2007, p. 1039). In addition, the
government in Khartoum, the state capital, had a proclivity for “addressing local
[Darfurian] conflicts by distributing arms to one side to suppress the other—a policy that
almost always came down in favor of the Arabs” (De Waal 2007, p. 1039). An example
of this is the central government’s support of the Janjaweed, a segment of Darfur’s
camel-herding Arab tribes and other Arab immigrants from Chad who wanted a slice of
Darfur (De Waal 2007, p, 1040). The central government made a deal with these Arab
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groups where they would let the groups pursue their own agenda as long as they
suppressed any rebellion in the area (De Waal 2007, p. 1040).
Sudan also experienced conflict between the ongoing civil war between the
central government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Although the
media portrays the Sudanese civil war as a clash between the north and the south, a more
accurate description would be wars between the “dominant central elite claiming Islamic
and Arab identity, and the peoples most marginalized by that elite, including southerners,
the Nuba people of southern Kordofan, and a number of groups in eastern and southeastern Sudan, all of them non-Arab,” and where many of them are non-Muslim (De
Waal 2007, p. 1040).
The ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber I had evidence, beginning with events starting after
March of 2003, that al-Bashir and other military leaders had planned to carry out attacks
against the civilian population of Darfur, namely the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups
whom they believed to be part of the insurgency in the area as well as close to the
Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM) (ICC, 2009). The forces used during the attacks included the Sudanese Armed
Forces, the Janjaweed militia, the Sudanese Police Forces and the National Intelligence
and Security Services (NISS), and the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) and
according to evidence submitted to the Pre-trial Chamber I, these were the specific
groups that committed the listed war crimes and crimes against humanity (ICC, 2009).
The Pre-Trial Chamber I also had evidence that Omar al-Bashir played an
essential role in these attacks as well as having “full control of all branches of the
‘apparatus’ of the State of Sudan, including the Sudanese Armed Forces and their allied
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Janjaweed militia, the Sudanese Police Forces, the NISS and the HAC” and used them to
implement the Government of Sudan counter-insurgency campaign (ICC, 2009). With
this evidence, the Pre-Trial Chamber I was able to issue a warrant of arrest, the first of its
kind for a sitting head of state, on March 4, 2009.
Both neoclassical realism and neoliberal institutionalism acknowledge the
anarchy of the international system. Neoliberal institutionalism would not see the system
as truly anarchic due to the cooperation of states achieved through institutions.
Furthermore, neoliberal institutionalism understands that cooperation is easy to achieve
in areas of mutual interest and thus the goal of the theory is to maximize the absolute
gains for all parties involved. The case of the indictment and arrest warrant of al-Bashir
shows is a major area where neoliberal institutionalism fails. One can see how it affects
humanitarian intervention by the fact that even though there is evidence of al-Bashir’s
crimes, the international community is still respecting Sudan’s right to sovereignty in the
classical sense and no nation-state is willing to support a military intervention or even to
be the one to step forth and arrest the President.
Although Sudan is a member of the United Nations, the most significant piece of
evidence for the support of international anarchy as recognized by neoclassical realism is
the fact that Sudan is not party to the Rome Statute, which was the founding treaty of the
International Criminal Court (Sharife 2009, p. 27). It was the International Criminal
Court who issued the arrest warrant for al-Bashir. Al-Bashir cited that although he did
sign it, the treaty was not ratified due to a more in-depth look at the “details and
consequences” (Dealey, 2009). Since Sudan did not ratify it, al-Bashir stipulates that he
should not be held to the provisions in the statute.
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In addition, there are at least three other major world powers, such as the China,
Russia and even the United States, who also have not signed or ratified this treaty
(Cooper 2009, p. 100). This is a failure of neoliberal institutionalism where it cites that
states will see the value in cooperation through institutions. It is a success for classical
realism as this institution, the United Nations, relies on the powers of its member states to
enforce its mandates, thus it shows that the states retain more of their sovereignty than
neoliberal institutionalism would like to have.
Slim (2004) agrees that international institutions as well as nongovernmental
organizations such as the International Crisis Group would also support the steadfast
concept of sovereignty as they too “stopped short of demanding a strong military
intervention to challenge Khartoum and the Janjaweed on the ground and so stop the
violence” (p. 826).
In addition, the greatest obstacle to neoliberal institutionalism and prosecution for
genocide or crimes against humanity is non-compliance or cheating by states. In alBashir’s own words, “the ICC is a political court and not a court of justice, because the
decision to refer the issue of Darfur to the ICC exempts American citizens from
appearing in front of the Court with the excuse that America is not a member of the
Roma Statue. We are not members of the [Rome] Statute” (Dealey, 2009). Al-Bashir
cites this as evidence for why he is not worried about the standing warrant for his arrest.
Although, not part of the Rome Statue, this defiance of the International Criminal Court’s
mandate for his arrest shows how powerless this international institution is, despite all the
other states who do support it. Furthermore, it supports the concept of international
anarchy advocated by classical realists since state sovereignty is still the highest
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international authority, and must be respected by supranational organizations given that
the nation-state still have the right not to be participants.
Another interesting prospect is that Sudan deposited an instrument of accession,
which has the same legal standing as a ratification, for the United Nations Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNGC) in 2003 (United
Nations, 2010). The Rome Statute is part of the United Nations in that it was brought to
the Assembly of State parties to sign but the International Criminal Court was established
as independent international organization to end impunity of for the perpetrators of
crimes internationally.
The original arrest warrant for al-Bashir did not contain any charges of genocide
but on February 3, 2010, the International Criminal Court rescinded its decision not to
include charges of genocide in the arrest warrant (HRW, 2010). This seems to be a legal
strategy by the International Criminal Court as Sudan signed the UNGC and this would
help prevent him from continuing posturing that the ICC cannot charge him because he is
not party to it. The ICC as an independent international organization was given the
jurisdiction to uphold international law and by including the charges of genocide they are
further supporting their legal standing that genocide and crimes against humanity will not
go unpunished.
Pertaining to the case studies for this paper, it is pertinent to inventory which
treaties or conventions each of the states is part of as prosecutors may run into similar
problems should any of the case be or become genocides.
Kenya is not party to the UNGC at all, while it ratified the Rome Statute in 2005
(United Nations, 2010). Nigeria, interestingly enough as evidence later demonstrates, is
22

on the brink of genocide and ratified the Rome Statute in 2001, while it deposited
documents of accession to the UNGC in July 2009 (United Nations, 2010). Like Sudan,
Yemen is party to the UNGC, having deposited document of accession in 1987, while
having only signed the Rome Statute in 2000 but not yet ratifying it (United Nations,
2010). The last case study, Ethiopia, signed and ratified the UNGC by 1949, while it has
not even signed the Rome Statue, putting it in the same position as Sudan if genocide or
crimes against humanity charges were to be issued (United Nations, 2010).
Related to international anarchy, neoliberal institutionalism would like to see the
concept of sovereignty redefined as stipulated by the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001). The ICISS was the Canadian
government’s response to former UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan’s call to reflect upon
what happened with the Security Council’s failure to intervene in Rwanda. It was also a
challenge to United Nations member states to “find common ground in upholding the
principles of the charter, and acting in defense of our common humanity” (ICISS, 2001,
p. 2). The importance of early warning can be seen from the document produced by the
ICISS produced in 2001.
The mandate of the ICISS was to “try to develop a global political consensus on
how to move from polemics—and often paralysis—towards action within the
international systems, particularly through the United Nations” (ICISS, 2001, p. 2). From
this, the ICISS was able to create a report on the Responsibility to Protect (2001). Its two
basic principles are:
1) State sovereignty implies the responsibility, and the primary responsibility
for the protection of its people lies with the state itself;
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2) Where a population is suffering serious harm as a result of internal war,
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is
unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention
yields to the international responsibility to protect (p. XI).
In addition, this document lists the responsibility to prevent as “to address both
the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting
populations at risk” (ICISS, 2001, p. XI). It also lists prevention as the “single most
important dimension of the responsibility to protect: prevention options should always be
exhausted before intervention is contemplated and more commitment and resources must
be devoted to it” (p. XI).
This document also discusses the decision to intervene as a last resort. The
measures that should happen before military intervention are financial sanctions,
restrictions on diplomatic representation and even suspension of membership or
expulsion from international or region bodies (ICISS, 2001). It states military
intervention should be used:
in extreme and exceptional cases, the responsibility to react may involve the need
to resort to military action…in which the very interest that all states have in
maintaining a stable international order requires them to react when all order
within a state has broken down or when civil conflict and repression are so violent
that civilians are threatened with massacre, genocide or ethnic cleansing on a
large scale (p. 31).
The importance of this document is that it is another step the international
community is making in understanding that by working together genocides and other
atrocities can be prevented. As the ICISS document states, prevention is where it needs to
start and that is the purpose of genocide early warning models.
Further study and refinement of the concept of “sovereignty as responsibility” by
neoliberal institutionalists cites that a state who is “unable or unwilling to carry out that
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function, the state abrogates its sovereignty, and the responsibility to protect devolves
onto the international actors” (Badescu and Bergholm 2009, p. 288). This concept of a
“responsibility to protect” also demonstrates the neoliberal institutionalist principle of
cooperation for absolute gains, especially when it come to the indictment of al-Bashir, as
it specifies that states need to be prepared:
to build the kind of capacity within international institutions, governments and
regional organizations that will ensure that, assuming there is an understanding of
the need to act—whether preventively or reactively, and whether through political
or diplomatic, political, or economic, or legal or policing and military measure—
there will be the physical capability to do so (Evans 2008, p. 289).
Another scholar, Stuart Elden (2006), also understands that sovereignty has
boundaries and limits. He cites that the responsibilities of sovereignty, called contingent
sovereignty are threefold:
State authorities are responsible for protecting the safety and lives of citizens and
promoting their welfare, responsible to their citizens internally and to the
international community through the United Nations, and responsible for their
actions, both acts of commission and omission (p. 17).

This means that states do not have blank check to do whatever they like within
their borders and this new understanding of the concept of sovereignty denotes that states
and state leaders will become accountable to the international community for their
actions.
These kinds of measures are what neoliberal institutionalists want to see
implemented when it comes to a state leader like al-Bashir who is committing crimes
against humanity, war crimes and even genocide against the people within his borders.
Neoliberal institutionalists distinguish that “international institutions provide the
framework for the elaboration and implementation of norms which attempt to regulate the
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behavior of states in dealing with such horrors as genocide” (Weiner 2008, p. 5). With alBashir’s continued defiance of the arrest warrant, it serves to erode the authority of
international institutions set up to prevent the crimes he has committed.
Furthermore, the United Nations, the European Union, the International Criminal
Court and other international institutions, are adhering to the traditional definition of
sovereignty, held by classical realism, where the state is the highest level of authority in
the international system. In addition, this shows that some of neoliberal institutionalism’s
principles do not work as it still operates in a world that accepts the classical realist
concept of sovereignty. Further evidence of this can be seen with the fact that the
International Criminal Court has no police force of its own and has had to rely on its
member states to enforce its mandates as well as the failure of members of the African
Union to support the ICC in their issuing of the arrest warrant. Also, Keohane (1988, p.
387) stipulated that “for international regimes to be effective, their injunctions must be
obeyed; yet sovereignty precludes hierarchical enforcement.” This shows that even
before the Rome statute, which was entered into force in 2002, scholars had foreseen the
problems of sovereignty and the lack of enforcement of mandate from international
institutions.
Totten and Bartrop (2004) make an interesting point as they criticize the United
Nations for its lack of intervention during genocides. They refer to Chapter VII, of the
United Nations Charter, where it gives the UN the power to act to prevent or intervene in
the case of genocide but it is ironic that member states disparage the inaction of the
United Nations when, in many cases, “it is those states, themselves, that are responsible
for deterring, if not outrightly preventing, in one way or another, the United Nations from
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acting in a timely and/or adequate fashion” (Totten and Bartrop 2004, p. 8). This further
undermines neoliberal institutionalism and its inability to overcome the sovereignty of
the states that makes the institutions significantly ineffective when applied to real world
scenarios.
Further evidence for the weakness of neoliberal institutionalism in international
politics comes from Reeves (2008) where he states “the UN, the AU (African Union), the
EU, and the United States have done nothing of consequence by way of accepting the socalled ‘responsibility to protect’ its civilians from crimes committed by their own
government.” The United Nations sends peacekeeping troops into Darfur and many of
them do not leave alive. This is the reality of neoliberal institutionalism in real world
cases; the institutions that fall under this theories principles lack the fundamental power
to enforce its mandates. Power here meaning, “the capabilities or resources with which
states can influence each other” (Rose 1998, p. 152).
In addition, to the above the lack of the support of many states of the African
Union demonstrates a kind of support for neoliberal institutionalism by showing that
cooperation, in this case, not supporting the ICC’s arrest warrant, will amount to absolute
gains for the parties involved (Reeves 2009, p. 10). This is due to the fact that they could
help to erode the ICC’s authority, thereby keeping the court from interfering in their own
state affairs, given that there are many controversial conflicts present in African states
(Reeves 2009, p. 10).
The example of Sudan has demonstrated a current case where genocide has
occurred yet much of the world is still standing by waiting to see what will happen. It
seems that after the Holocaust, Cambodia, and then Rwanda, the international community
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would not wait to launch a humanitarian intervention. The world is once again mired in
the politics of classical sovereignty, despite overwhelming evidence of if not genocide,
then the mass murder of civilians. The case of Sudan is yet another justification for the
need of a genocidal early warning system as well as the implementation of the
Responsibility to Protect doctrine.

Early Warning

As early as 1987, components of the international community were beginning to
develop early warning systems for a variety of purposes. Examples of the extent of the
areas are refugee and human rights violations, ethnopolitical conflict, armed conflict/arms
productions, militarized disputes, famine/food supplies, crisis development, minorities
and terrorism (Austin, 2004).
The concept of early warning can be described as “any initiative that focuses on
systematic data collection, analysis and/or formulation of recommendations, including
risk assessment and information sharing…to obtain knowledge and to use that knowledge
to assist in the mitigation of conflict” (Austin, 2004, p. 1). There are four different
categories of early warning: (a) correlational models—identify connections among
conflict phenomena; (b) sequential models—track when high-risk and tense situations are
likely to erupt into crisis; (c) response models—evaluates responses to interventions
given that one is dealing with an interactive system; (d) conjunctural—aims at explaining
complex patterns and thresholds (van de Goor & Verstegen, 1999, p. 7-8). This last
category (d) is not concerned with understanding the how or why of the escalation of a
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conflict but focuses on the intensification of the conflict situations (van de Goor &
Verstegen, 1999). In addition, conjunctural models “operate using predefined indicators
but differ [from other models] insofar as they do not examine the magnitude but rather
the relationship between and combination of, indicators” (Austin, 2004, p. 9).
One of the early models concerned with genocide was developed by Barbara
Harff (1994), called the Accelerators of Genocide Project. Harff created this model with a
case studies approach where she looked at the basic chronology of the conflict, the
theoretically specific conditions (causal variables) of communal conflicts, and then an
analysis of accelerators derived from event data (van de Goor & Verstegen, 1999). Her
approach, as a sequential early warning model, then “specifies the variables that
accelerate geno/politicide, and then operationalized the accelerator variables using events
data” (van de Goor & Verstegen, 1999, p.44).
To test her model, she compared perpetrator and non-perpetrator states and found
that in the cases where background and intervening conditions “indicated high levels of
risk of genocide or humanitarian crisis, accelerators were useful in providing early
warning indices of which cases were sliding toward genocide and when” (van de Goor &
Verstegen, 1999, p.44). Although this model provides a strong argument for monitoring
situations based on pre-specified and standardized indicators, only a small number of
cases have been tested, and those cases were only tested retrospectively.
The second early warning model on the subject of genocide was the Life Integrity
Violation Analysis (LIVA), also known as the “Good Enough Model” by Helen Fein
(1992). In this response model, Fein used content analysis of Amnesty International
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reports “to assess whether sates perpetrating geno/politicides can be distinguished from
other states before a humanitarian emergency actually begins” (Aliboni et al, 2001).
Furthermore, the aim of this model is to detect signs of escalation of violence
towards geno/politicides and to “relate the levels of violation to underlying and
intervening causes and to relate life integrity violations to other kinds of rights
violations” (van de Goor & Verstegen, 1999, p.46). In addition, Fein focused on the
responses at pressure points and the indicators derived from the theoretical model where
they are to apprehend and not to explain, therefore the model is “Good Enough.” The
relevance of her findings demonstrated that “perpetrators differ from non-perpetrators by
different patterns of life integrity violations” and thus the need for a focus on the
ideologies and goals of states.
Harff's research with colleague Ted Gurr has also been pivotal in the field of
genocide studies (1998). Numerous other scholars and organizations that have attempted
to construct early warning models for genocide and many were unsuccessful. However,
the model proposed by Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr was actually able to create an
early warning system based on the State Failure project and the Minorities at Risk project
(Harff and Gurr, 1998). This earlier model used accelerators international background
conditions and intervening conditions, such as a governing elite's commitment to an
ideology that excludes categories of people and charismatic leadership (Harff and Gurr,
1998) to provide the framework for warning of a potential genocide.
Harff's (2003) later model, the fourth early warning model, expands on her
previous theoretical work to test six variables and indicators that she considers
"preconditions for genocide and politicide." Her newer model, which is better described
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as a correlational model as opposed to a sequential model like her previous, provides a
“framework for assessing and comparing the vulnerability of countries with state failures
to genocide and politicide” (Harff, 2003, p. 70) (See APPENDIX A: GENOCIDE RISK
ASSESSMENT MODEL).
This model’s six variables that are used to assess the risk of genocide/politicide:
(1) political upheaval; (2) prior genocides; (3) type of political systems; (4) ethnic and
religious cleavages; (5) low economic development; and (6) international context (Harff,
2003). She later added a seventh variable in 2005, which looked to see whether
“minorities are targeted for severe political or economic discrimination” (Woocher, 2007,
p. 21). The testing of her model was performed retrospectively with cases from 1955 to
2001, although in her conclusion she created a table of armed conflicts present since 2001
and uses her six variables to assess their risk of genocide/politicide. The implications of
her research showed that “the probability of mass murder is highest under autocratic
regimes and is most likely to be set in motion by elites who advocate an exclusionary
ideology, or represent an ethnic minority, or both” (Harff, 2003, p. 70).
While this model of risk assessment for genocide is considered to be the most
accurate of what is presently out there, it contains a few flaws. The first major flaw, as
explained by Woocher (2007), is that there is a time lag in collecting the data. This time
lag inevitably means that by the time one can collect the data, it is too late to have taken
any responsive actions.
Harff’s model does an impressive job of retrospectively showing that her six
variables are very reliable in assessing the risk of genocide but it is not able to analyze
current events where it may only have two of the six variables needed. This leads to a
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Type II error, or a “false negative,” for the genocide or politicide risk. The model
constructed for this paper contains many of the common characteristics found in the
existing literature; some of them are very similar to Harff’s variables. The benefit of this
model, which shows three different levels of risk—Most likely, likely, and least likely—
is that it is possible to demonstrate the possibility of genocide with the limited, but
available, data and would not be limited by indicators that have yet to be measured.
Furthermore, Harff's model uses the state as the primary level of analysis, which
will only capture those indicators at the state level. While the state is usually the key
perpetrator in a genocide, the model presented later in this paper would also include
characteristics from followers, bystanders, and an outsider group or groups. In addition,
models that only use state level data will not be able to determine which group is at risk
and therefore miss the mark of an early warning system (Woocher, 2007).
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CHAPTER TWO: METHODS

Conceptual Framework

Most genocide research tends to treat each case of genocide as unique. Since
scholars are able to find similarities stemming from the followers, intent, and even the
types of government for genocides around the world, there will be common
characteristics that most genocides share. The model attempts to combine these shared
characteristics to find out the combination or interaction of these elements that is needed
to produce a genocide.
The model used for each case study analysis is a three-by-six table where the rows
are numbered "1, 2 and 3," and the columns are labeled "a-f" (See APPENDIX B:
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK). This genocide measure has been constructed with a
top-down approach where it begins at the state level, goes through the individual level
and ends with the overall political environment. The column headings are Government,
Leaders/Elites, Followers, Non-Followers/Bystanders, Outsider Group and Environment,
and refer to the indicator variables that may or may not be present in a case. Row 3, Least
Likely, is where countries that have the listed characteristics for the categories will have
the least likely chance of progressing into the genocide. Row 1, Most Likely, has
characteristics that many genocides share and will mean that if the type of government,
leaders, followers, etc., begin to personify these characteristics or are already present; the
chances for the conflict developing into a genocidal event are most likely. The Likely
row, row 2, has characteristics of both Most Likely and Least Likely, meaning that it
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contains key elements of genocide but there might be other factors that hinder or serve as
the catalyst to instigate genocide. Three of the six indicator variables come from a
framework created by Padilla, Hogan and Kaiser (2007), where they created a tripartite
framework of destructive leadership (See APPENDIX C: THE TOXIC TRIANGLE). By
destructive leadership, they cite that it involves “imposing goals on constituents without
their agreement or regard for their long-term welfare” (p. 177).
Furthermore, destructive leadership involves control and coercion instead of
persuasion and commitment, as well as focusing on the leader’s goals as opposed to the
needs of the constituents (p. 179). Also, “the effects of destructive leadership are seen in
organization outcomes that compromise the quality of life for constituents (whether
internal or external to the organization) and detract from their main purpose” (p.179).
They list their "toxic triangle" to consist of destructive leaders, who are
charismatic, have a personalized need for power (unethical use of power), narcissistic,
have experienced severe hardships in life and proclaim ideologies of hate (p.180). This
indicator variable is under the Leader(s)/Elites (1b and 2b), where a case that would be
likely and most likely to be considered a genocide would exhibit these characteristics in
their leaders or elites. Another characteristic under the Leader(s)/Elites (1b and 2b), from
Harff (2003), would be exclusionary ideology, which she defines as "a belief system that
identifies some overriding purpose or principle that justifies efforts to restrict, persecute,
or eliminate certain categories of people" (p. 63). This exclusionary ideology also serves
as the basis for support to keep the outsider group separate from the rest of the
population.
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This characteristic is important because it has been present in past genocides that
have been recognized by the international community, such as the Holocaust and
Rwanda. A possible genocide (Row 2, Likely) would involve the presence of a
destructive leader as well as exclusionary ideology. The Least Likely possibility (3b) of a
genocide would have a leader who would be a representative of the people through fair
elections. The overall importance of the leader’s characteristics for a genocide comes
from the fact that previous genocide leaders, such as Hitler, were charismatic. From
Padilla et al.’s research (2007), and previous research, “destructive leadership and
charisma are empirically linked” (p. 180).
Susceptible followers are the next part of Padilla et al.’s toxic triangle. Those in
this category may belong to the colluder group, and this is specified by the Followers
indicator variable (1c and 2c). This category is where they have ambitions and
worldviews similar to the destructive leader and are usually more selfish than others are
and therefore further their own needs in supporting the destructive leader. Furthermore, it
seems logical that the colluder group will only be present in genocidal cases, as they are
needed for the support of the leader or elites.
The other group is the conformer group, under susceptible followers, which is the
Non-Followers/Bystanders indicator variable (1d and 2d). This indicator variable
demonstrates that the followers have unmet needs and low core self-evaluations, or are
psychologically immature and thus more likely to conform to authority as well as
conform out of fear (Padilla et al., 2007, p. 183).
Lastly, conducive environments, the Environment indicator variable (1f, Most
Likely), is where there is political instability in the government, perceived outside threats,
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collective cultural values, which means cultures that emphasize group loyalty, and
complete lack of minority rights protection from the government. Under the Likely row
(2f), this level only contains the possibility of political instability and the presence of
some minority rights protection given from the government. Padilla et al. (2007) cite that
collective cultures prefer strong leaders to bring people together and this might help to
contribute to gaining support for their exclusionary ideology. Under the Likely row (2f), it
only includes the political instability and the presence of some minority rights protection
by the government. This indicator variable is important because “during times of
instability, leaders can enhance their power by advocating radical change to restore
order” as well as the fact that “when people feel threatened, they are more willing to
accept assertive leadership” (Padilla et al., 2007, p. 185). Here, political instability is
defined as “propensity of a change in the executive power, either by constitutional or
unconstitutional means” (Alesina et al., 1996, p. 191).
It is important to point out that the Followers, Non-Followers/Bystanders and
Outsider Group indicator variables for the Least Likely category (3c, 3d, 3e) contain
essentially the same characteristics. This is because there is no definitive difference
between the three groups as they make up the selectorate and all three of them have rights
protected by the state.
The Government indicator variable (1a, 2a, 3a) is included in the table to account
for whether the government is accountable to its people. Previous research (Aydin &
Gates, 2007, Eck & Hultman, 2007, and Harff, 2003) has indicated that autocratic rule,
with the lack of checks and balances, has been a precondition to many past genocides.
The Most Likely category (1a) contains the mentioned characteristics as well as types of
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government in which people have limited rights and little to no government
accountability. Furthermore, the Likely row (2a) includes new democracies as well as
unconsolidated democracies, as Harff’s (2003) research has also shown that failed states
were shown to be prevalent in areas where genocides had occurred, specifically after the
failure of democracy in a given state. As expected, the Least Likely category (3a) contains
stable democracies and governments that are accountable to its people. Democratic
consolidation is defined as “the process by which the structures and norms of democracy
have been firmly established and supported by the general public so that the regime gains
persistence and the capability to overcome possible challenges” (Morlino, 1995, p. 146).
In other words, democracy becomes routinized in social, institutional and even in
psychological ways (Linz and Stepan, 1996). In addition, Linz and Stepan (1996) identify
a consolidated democracy as a democratic regime in a territory:
Behaviorally, when no significant national, social, economic, political, or
institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their
objective by creating nondemocratic regimes or by seceding from the state;
Attitudinally…when a strong majority of public opinion, even in the midst of
major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, hold the
belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to
govern collective life; Constitutionally… when governmental and
nongovernmental forces alike become subject to, and habituated to, the resolution
of conflict within the bounds of specific laws, procedures, and institutions
sanctioned by the new democratic process (p. 16)
Both definitions serve essentially the same purpose: to show that a state cannot be
a consolidated democracy without the institutionalization and routinization of democratic
principles into the general populace as well throughout the structure of the government.
The Outsider Group indicator variable (1e, 2e, 3e) is included to measure whether
there is a group that is being persecuted by the state. This variable comes from the
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definition of genocide chosen for this paper where there is a group that has been chosen
to be destroyed based on their group membership. Characteristics of this outsider group
are unmobilized, loosely organized, defenseless, disenfranchised, considered a threat
(Baum, 2008). In addition, this group is considered to be removed or separate from the
rest of the population. Without a specific target group, an event of mass killing would not
be considered a genocide.
The significance of this research is that no other model attempts to find the
necessary or sufficient conditions of a genocide. In addition, according to Austin (2003),
there are only three early warning models on the subject of genocide and none of them
are conjunctural models. Furthermore, the field of conjunctural genocide modeling is still
in its infancy as there have only been a small handful of scholars attempting this type of
model (See Brecke 2000 and van de Goor & Verstegen, 1999). Since most genocide
research focuses on what comprises a genocide, this paper will be interested in the cases
that may contain only a few characteristics of a genocide. This would better show what
conditions are needed for an event to become a genocide; given there will already be a
presence of violent conflict within the state based on the selection of cases. In addition,
the model that has been created is a conjunctural model meaning it will be concerned
with the different combinations of indicator variables in a country's violent conflict
situation. Depending on the relationship and combination between the indicators, it may
determine what set of circumstances are needed for a conflict to be classified as a
genocide. The main research question that this paper will address is what set of specific
relationships or indicators are needed for a case of violent conflict to be classified as a
genocide.
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Other questions this paper will be interested in addressing are: (a) what set of
indicators create a "critical mass" for genocide? (b) Is it a specific set of indicators that
create a genocide or is there a minimum number of indicators needed, or both?

Data

The analysis conducted in this paper will be a comparative case study
examination of select occurrences of violent conflict that have not been classified as a
potential "genocide" by the international community. This leaves a large amount of cases
to choose from but it eliminates cases such as Darfur and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, which different international groups have called for immediate humanitarian
intervention on the basis of genocide or crimes against humanity.
It has only been recently that genocide scholars have taken to studying more than
one or two genocides. Previous scholars have only limited themselves to one genocide or
another, a single-shot case study method, which in essence has contributed the
fragmentation of the field as well as the variety of typologies and definitions that have
been created. Furthermore, scholars have tended to study cases independently of each
other, which have led to many to draw broad conclusions about genocide from a single
case and this sometimes has led to the “uniqueness” or “primacy” (Totten, 2004). This
kind of study is referred to as “athoretical case study” by Lijphart (1971) where “they are
neither guided by established or hypothesized generalization nor motivated by a desire to
formulate general hypotheses” (p. 691). Some genocide scholars have also employed the
“interpretive case study” where “a generalization is applied to a specific case with the
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aim of throwing light to a case rather than of improving the generalization in any way”
(Lijphart, 1971, p. 692). These two case study methodologies only serve to illuminate the
case as a possible genocide without actually comparing them to any other cases for
validation. Other scholars still have developed typologies in which they have detected
common characteristics but have not gone much further in broadly comparing the
different cases.
Huttenbach writes that genocide scholars must use a broad comparative method
that both stresses the similarities and the dissimilarities of genocide where “the specific
singular identity of a genocidal event sets it apart from others, and also to highlight
common features that individual genocides share with other” (Totten, 2004, p. 240). This
serves to begin to address the fundamental problem of the lack of consensus among
genocide scholars. Huttenbach also stipulates that with a governing definition and a
systematic way of comparing genocides, the rational guidelines of a genocide must begin
from “an accepted anatomy or skeletal structure, serving as a reference point, a source of
key aspects of genocide which need to be compared, as a means of distinguishing and,
equally importantly, relating genocides to one another as types” (Totten, 2004, p. 242).
The comparative case study methodology this paper uses is that of the
“hypothesis-generating case study” where the case studies started out “with a more or
less vague notion of possible hypotheses, and attempt to formulate definite hypotheses to
be tested subsequently among a larger number of cases” (Lijphart, 1971, p. 692). There
was scholarly support for different characteristics included in the model for this paper but
it was not known what hypotheses would be produced from analyzing the case studies
based on the conceptual framework.
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Three cases were chosen based on whether or not there was a presence of violent
conflict, recent or ongoing, between the state and its people. One case, Kenya, was
chosen based on the fact that the violent conflict was polarizing the ethnic groups within
the state. In this case, there was still an outsider group present, but this group occupies
the elite position in the hierarchy of power in the state.
Cases were not chosen based solely on the definition as this would invalidate the
measure and it was not clear whether the definition really mattered in determining
whether a case was a genocide or not. In addition, this would have been selecting on the
dependent variable and thus selection bias. Cases were determined with killings or
incidences of violent conflict up to two years, as far back as January 2008. This was done
by first identifying countries from the CrisisWatch monthly reports of the International
Crisis Group, which had unchanged or deteriorating crisis situations in the past 2 years.
Next, a variety of sources such as scholarly journals, news articles, and reports created by
non-governmental institutions were used to research the case study and verify that there
was a presence of violent conflict between the state and any part of its population; Kenya
as the deviant case for its strong ethnic violence. Cases such as Mali and Uzbekistan were
rejected due to a lack of information available. This lack of information seems to come
from the lack of international interest, even with the presence of violent conflict. Somalia
was another case which was not chosen given the complexity of the current situation on
the ground as well as the lack of reliable information.
Cases from South America were also excluded as initial examinations of the
possible cases overtly demonstrated that many were civil wars. Other cases such as the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan were also not chosen as many third party
41

international groups have labeled these conflicts as genocides and this paper is not
selecting cases on the dependent variable.
Kenya was chosen as a case study for its violent conflict after the 2007 election. It
appeared that it contained characteristics of a genocide such as targeting of an ethnic
group as well as being an unconsolidated democracy. This case had a strong presence of
ethnic group violence, which has been supported by many researchers as a root cause of
genocide. Including Kenya as a case study was interesting to see how the ethnic violence
did or did not contribute towards a genocide, as well as the possibility of transitioning to
state sponsored violence later in time.
Nigeria was examined as a case study for the presence of an in-group and outgroup, where the out-group was discriminated against based on the lack of ability to
prove their origin in the state of Nigeria. By law, many Nigerians have to prove their
origin somewhere in Nigeria to be able to qualify for certain jobs and to even study at a
university. This legal segregation is evocative of the legal segregation the Jews went
through during the Holocaust.
Yemen contained the element of a rebel group fighting against the government. It
also met the definition chosen for this paper whereby the perpetrator intends to destroy a
group and the membership of that group is determined by the perpetrator. This case was
chosen to explore how being labeled a “rebel” would determine if it could still be
considered a genocide if it contained the rest of the needed indicator variables. In
addition, new research (See Shaw, 2007) has suggested that it is not enough that the
government intends to destroy a group of people; the victims have to also be civilians.
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Ethiopia was the last case study chosen for this paper. After becoming familiar
with the conflict history, it became apparent that this case study was similar to Yemen in
that there is an insurgent group in present conflict with the government. The difference
between the two cases is that Ethiopia’s case contains evidence of the government
deliberately sanctioning the terrorizing, punishment and forced removal of civilians in
villages that have been deemed to be supporting the rebel groups, whether there is actual
evidence or not.
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CHAPTER THREE: KENYA

Overview of the Conflict

Kenya is composed of three broad linguistic groups: Bantu, Nilotic and Cushite
(Center for African Studies, 2010). The Kikuyu, ethnic group of President Kibaki, is the
largest group and even though it only comprises 20% of the population. This ethnic group
also mainly inhabits the Mount Kenya region, Northwest of Kenya’s capital, Nairobi
(Center for African Studies, 2010). The second largest ethnic group, the Luo, speaks
Nilotic and mostly lives near Lake Victoria (Makoloo, 2005). The third largest ethnic
group is the Luhya, who also speaks Bantu, and the great majority of the group lives in
the Western part of Kenya, near the border with Uganda (Center for African Studies,
2010). The Cushite speaking peoples make up a small minority of Kenya’s population as
well as the rest of the 42 ethnic groups living in Kenya (Center for African Studies,
2010).

Figure 1 Map of Kenya
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The British colonizers established the East African Protectorate in 1895 and
settled in the most fertile territory called the White Highlands (US Department of State,
Kenya, 2010). Under colonialism, “large tracts of fertile land (i.e. the White Highlands,
lands where white immigrants settled) were alienated and many Kenyans were pushed
into ‘native reserves’ that were not conducive for arable farming” (Makoloo, 2005, p.
25). Furthermore, under the independence agreement with the British, Kenyans were to
buy the land from its colonizer but as it turned out that land redistribution was skewed in
favor of the Kikuyu by distributing the White Highlands to them first (Makoloo, 2005).
This was partly due to the fact that the Kikuyu already had the capital to be able to afford
to buy the land. The other ethnic groups perceived this imbalance as extremely unfair and
in the decade after independence, this led to disputes between the Kikuyu and the other
disregarded ethnic groups (Kenya, 2008).
When Kenya gained its independence on December 12, 1963, Mzee Jomo
Kenyatta became the prime minister and was subsequently elected as Kenya’s first
president a year later (Makoloo, 2005). Kenyatta was an ethnic Kikuyu and head of the
Kenyan African National Union (KANU) who had run against the minority party, the
Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU) in the first election (Kenya, 2008). This
minority party represented “a coalition of small ethnic groups that had feared dominance
by larger ones” but dissolved soon after the election and joined the KANU (Background
Note: Kenya, 2010). In 1966, the leftist opposition party to the KANU, the Kenya
People’s Union (KPU) was formed; led by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Luo tribe elder, but
was later banned and the KANU became Kenya’s only political party (Background Note:
Kenya, 2010). During Kenyatta’s presidency, he concentrated on economic growth by
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instituting policies that were geared toward a mixed economy rather than a socialist
economy (Makoloo, 2005). The result of these policies was a widening gap between the
rich and the poor as well as the continued acquisition of land by the Kikuyu and its
cousin communities, the Embu and Meru (Makoloo, 2005). In addition, Kenyatta
maintained the social exclusion and the previous government policies, which still exist
today. This exacerbated the already growing tensions between the Kikuyu and the other
overlooked ethnic groups, especially with the Kelenjin the Rift Valley.
After Kenyatta’s death in 1978, his Vice President, Daniel arap Moi, took over the
position (Kenya, 2008). Moi’s presidency was characterized by suppressing opposition,
ignoring demands for democratization and consolidating the power of his presidency
(Kenya, 2008). The constitution was amended in 1982 to make Kenya officially a oneparty state (Background Note: Kenya, 2010). It was not until 1991 that the Kenyan
legislature passed an amendment to the constitution that legalized a multiparty
democracy and in 1992; Moi was reelected as the first multiparty democratic president
(Kenya, 2008).
After the 1997 election, “Kenya experienced its first coalition government as
KANU was forced to cobble together a majority by bringing into government a few
minor parties” (Background Note: Kenya, 2010). In 2002, Mwai Kibaki, another Kikuyu,
was elected as Kenya’s third president. Similar to Moi’s presidency, Kibaki spent his
time in office opposing revisions to the constitution that would reduce his powers as well
as organizing his cabinet to only include his supporters (Kenya, 2008). He doubled his
efforts after voters rejected a draft of the constitution in 2005 that kept most of the
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powers of the executive with the president and did not share with the prime minister
(Kenya, 2008).
Prior to the 2007 election, Kenya experienced a corruption scandal in the
President’s cabinet as well as interstate clashes with Ethiopian soldiers (Kenya, 2008). In
the 2007 election, President Kibaki, as the Party of National Unity candidate, ran against
Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) (Kenya, 2008).
Immediately after the results of the Kenyan presidential election were announced
on December 30, 2007, the country descended in to political turmoil and violent conflict.
Initial results portrayed Odinga as in the lead but when the Electoral Commission of
Kenya (ECK) formally announced the results, Kibaki was declared the winner and had
one with only a narrow lead over his opponent, Odinga (ICG, 2008). Many ODM
supporters erupted into violence as they suspected election fraud and in the slums of
Nairobi, Kisumu, Eldoret and Mombasa “protests and confrontations with the police
rapidly turned into revenge killings targeting representative of the political opponent’s
ethnic base [Kikuyu]” (ICG, 2008, p. 2). In addition, Kikuyu, Embu and Meru (ethnically
aligned) were violently evicted from areas that were dominated by Luo and Luha ethnic
groups who were aligned with the ODM (ICG, 2008). Many Kikuyu settlements were the
victims of vigilante attacks in the Rift Valley (ICG, 2008). On the other hand, Luo,
Luhya and Kalenjin ethnic groups were also ejected from Kikuyu dominated areas (ICG,
2008).
Soon after the election results, the ECK chair admitted that irregularities had
occurred, such as constituencies reporting voting rates above 100% and other
abnormalities were confirmed by national and international observers (ICG, 2008).
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Indicator Variables

For this case study, four out of the six indicator variables are present but this case
contains characteristics in both the Likely and Most Likely rows (See APPENDIX D:
KENYA’S INDICATOR VARIABLES). In addition, this case does not fit the definition
chosen where genocide is “a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other
authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by
the perpetrator” (Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990, p. 15).
The first indicator variable present is Government, under the Likely row (2a). In
this case, it is not hard to see that it is an unconsolidated democracy, meaning “elections
are regularly held but are widely suspect of being highly fraudulent and in which the
executive manipulates the rules of the game to circumvent or silence the legislature, the
courts, and the press” (Seligson and Carrion, 2002, p. 59). Also, Evidence here can be
cited as the contested results of the 2007 presidential election, in addition to the fact that
President Kibaki threw out the leaders of the opposition group, the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) (Kagwanja and Southall, 2009). He also reorganized his cabinet with people
who would favor him when the LDP did not vote for a new draft of the constitution that
would increase the executive’s powers (Kagwanja and Southall, 2009). More evidence
for Kenya being classified as an unconsolidated democracy would be that prior to 2002, a
single leader, Daniel arap Moi, and a single party, the Kenyan African National Union
(KANU), ruled for about twenty-four years, until Kibaki was elected in 2002 (BBC,
2009). This lack of strong democratic institutions and government accountability could
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continue and drag Kenya into an authoritarian regime, which increases the likelihood of
this situation turning into a genocide (Harff, 2003).
Non-Followers/Bystanders, (2d), are present in this case of conflict. Verification
of this variable come from the fact that there are organized opposition political groups in
Kenya (Kagwanja and Southall, 2009) and not just a presence of defenseless, unaware, or
in denial masses.
The third indicator variable present in this case is that of an Outsider Group, in
the Likely row (2e). Support of this variable is derived from the Kikuyu ethnic group
being target by other ethnic groups holding a vendetta for the rigged elections. As they
belong to the same ethnic group as the corrupt president, members the Kikuyu ethnicity
are serving as a proxy for the other Kenyan ethnic groups as they are resented for being
the most prosperous for years as well as having retained power in the government for so
long (Gettleman, 2008). This prosperity could also been seen as threatening to the other
ethnic groups who may fear how that power may be translated. Furthermore, the people
in the ethnic groups are civilians and not part of a rebel or paramilitary group, leaving
them defenseless.
The final indicator variable present is Environment, under Likely (2e). Here,
political instability is defined as the “propensity of a change in the executive power,
either by constitutional or unconstitutional means” (Alesina et al., 1996, p. 191).
Evidence for this indicator political instability characteristic comes from the aftermath of
the contested elections where there was an immediate backlash from many Kenyans
targeting Kikuyus for revenge killings “in protest against the theft of the presidency and
to seek revenge on the Kikuyu and Kisii communities perceived to be loyal to Kibaki”
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(ICG, 2008, p. 1). The security forces employed by the state were ordered to retaliate and
suppress opposition by Kibaki (Ashforth, 2009). Although it is not clear how much
minorities are protected by the government in the case of conflict in Kenya, what is
obvious is the fact that the “multi-ethnic party coalitions reflect the demographic reality
that Kenya is a county of ethnic minorities as opposed to clear ethnic bifurcation in
countries like Rwanda and Burundi” (Kagwanja and Southall, 2009, p.265).

Discussion

Overall, there are too few indicator variables present with this case for it to be
classified as a genocide. Primarily, this case does not fit the definitional criteria and as
well as missing the Leader/Elites variable where they would advocate an exclusionary
ideology, meaning they have a “belief system that identifies some overriding purpose or
principle that justifies efforts to restrict, persecute, or eliminate certain categories of
people” (Harff, 2003, p.62-63), or an ideology of hate. This case only provides that the
masses have a reason to persecute the elites who are in power. In addition, there is no
presence of a leader, as part of the elite, who exhibits the characteristics of being
destructive. Although, there is some evidence of Kibaki’s goal to obtain more
personalized power (Mueller, 2008), he does not demonstrate any of the other traits of a
destructive leader.
As part of the lack of an exclusionary ideology, the Followers indicator variable is
absent from this case. This indicator is dependent on the presence of an exclusionary
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ideology as supported by the Leader/Elites and thus not included. It should also be noted
that an exclusionary ideology can be present without the Leader/Elites indicator variable.
Furthermore, the variables that can be accounted for, the four out of six are not
enough in of themselves for the case of conflict in Kenya to be considered a genocide. An
interesting prospect that could easily change this scenario would be the ascension to
power of another ethnic group who continues the blood feud against the Kikuyu group.
Another possible situation for Kenya’s future would be the continued unraveling of its
democracy, which could lead to Kibaki gaining more executive power to be able to
suppress the ethnic classes as well as his opposition.
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CHAPTER FOUR: NIGERIA

Overview of the Conflict

Although the presence of violent conflict in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria has
garnered much media attention, this case study will focus on the violence between ethnic
groups in the Plateau state. Nigeria is broken up into 36 states where each one has its own
governor; in the Plateau state the governor is Jonah Jang (US Department of State,
Nigeria, 2009).

Figure 2 Nigeria Linguistic Groups

Many sources cite that Nigeria has 250 ethnic groups; Mustapha (2003) writes
that the number varies due to the criteria used to classify the groups. Sources do agree
that there are three ethnic group majorities: the Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba and the Ibo
(Mustapha, 2003) (See Figure 2). The other ethnic groups are considered “ethnic
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minorities” (Mustapha, 2003). The Hausa-Fulani primarily inhabit the Northwest and
East part of the country; the Yoruba in the Southwest; and the Ibo in the South and
Southeast (Mustapha, 2003).
Islam was brought to the area by way of trade with Egypt and other Arab
countries in the 13th century and was adopted by the Hausa people (Hutchinson
Encyclopedia, Nigeria, 2009). British and Portuguese slave traders began to raid the
coastal regions in the 15th and 16th centuries (Hutchinson Encyclopedia, Nigeria, 2009).
The following centuries brought wars, political discord and when the Fulani invaded the
Hausa states in the 18th century, the country was further weakened (Hutchinson
Encyclopedia, Nigeria, 2009).
The British began to influence the area with the purchase of Lagos from a native
chief in 1861 (Hutchinson Encyclopedia, Nigeria, 2009). Lagos was incorporated under
the government of Sierra Leone and later added to the Southern Nigeria Protectorate in
1906 (Hutchinson Encyclopedia, Nigeria, 2009). Under British rule in 1900, the northern
part of the country was known as the Northern Nigeria protectorate and southern was
known as the Southern Nigeria Protectorate (Hutchinson Encyclopedia, Nigeria, 2009).
In 1914, the north and the south were united and formed the colony and Protectorate of
Nigeria (Hutchinson Encyclopedia, Nigeria, 2009).
After World War II, the southern part of the country began to vie for
independence while the northern part hesitated for fear that they would be dependent on
the south and its access to commerce through the coast (World Politics, 2009). Before
Nigeria achieved independence in 1960, the area was rife with racial and religious riots
that made it seem like independence under one state would lead to more violence (World
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Politics, 2009). After independence, the constitution was made to encompass the three
main regions—north, east, and west—and the eastern leader, Namdi Azikiwe, became
president and the federal premiership went to a northerner, Sir Abubakr Tafewa Balewa
(World Politics, 2009). The constitution broke down when a census portrayed that more
than half of the county’s population resided in the north and also due to an Ibo
insurrection, in 1966, where they protested the north and its western allies (World
Politics, 2009). The junior Ibo officers murdered the federal and northern prime ministers
and the country went through a handful leaders, all who could not solve the problems
with the constitution and how it would satisfy all the different ethnic groups (World
Politics, 2009).
In 1966, Lieutenant-Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, the appointed military governor
of the eastern region, came to realize that the only way for the Ibos to survive was for
them to become independent, so in 1967, he proclaimed the independent state of Biafra
and a civil war began (World Politics, 2009). With Britain and the USSR supplying arms
to the federal government, France was not able to keep up support for the secessionist
state and in 1970, Biafra surrendered (World Politics, 2009). The 1970’s and the 1980’s
were rife with leaders promising a return to civilian rule but never delivering, rigged
elections, corruption, and religious conflicts between Muslims and Christians (World
Politics, 2009). Nigeria’s only source of wealth was oil and the oil crisis in the 1970’s
further weakened its economy (World Politics, 2009).
In the midst of the oil crisis, the first peaceful transfer to civilian rule occurred
when Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo handed his presidential power over to
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President Alhaji Shehu Shagari in 1979 but civilian rule only lasted until 1983 (Library of
Congress, July 2008).
In 1985, General Ibrahim Babangida, a prominent figure in Nigeria’s political
arena, evicted the previous leader, Major-General Muhammad Buhari, and became tasked
with restoring the economy, restoring civilian rule and keeping the regional conflicts
from becoming a war between the north and south along the Christian/Muslim divide
(World Politics, 2009). Given that Babangida ruled by corruption and deceit, sometimes
canceling elections, and was replaced by his deputy General Sani Abacha who governed
no better than his predecessors (World Politics, 2009). Abacha died suddenly in office in
1998 and was replaced by his second-in-command Abdulsalam Abubakr until the
elections were held in 1999 (World Politics, 2009). Ex-General Obasanjo became the first
civilian president and as an Yoruba, he had strong support from the northern and eastern
regions but failed to garner support elsewhere (World Politics, 2009).
Nigeria continued to be deeply divided over its dependence on oil, triggering
violence in the delta region, as well as the periodic clashes between Muslims and
Christians, keeping the country in a weakened state (World Politics, 2009). In addition,
religious tensions continued to fester as sharia law was instituted in 2000 in the north,
which are primarily Muslim states (Library of Congress, July 2008). Despite wanting to
run for a third term, Obasanjo could not garner enough support in the Nigerian Senate to
amend the constitution in 2006 to allow it and Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, of the People’s
Democratic Party won the 2007 election (Library of Congress, July 2008).
Prior to the violent event this case study highlights, which is in November 2008,
there were already policies and practices that contributed to a rift in the population. Since
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its colonial period, the population of Nigeria has been broken up into “indigene” and
“non-indigene” communities (Human Rights Watch, 2006). Indigene refers to a person
“who belongs to the group of people who were the original inhabitant of a particular
place and who therefore claim to be its rightful ‘owners’” (HRW, 2006, p. 5). It is worth
noting that the Nigerian constitution (see References for link), Chapter 6, section 144,
number 3, states that:
Any appointment under subsection (2) of this section by the President shall be in
conformity with the provisions of section 14(3) of this Constitution: provided that
in giving effect to the provisions aforesaid the President shall appoint at least one
Minister from each State, who shall be an indigene of such State.
Although the constitution uses the word “indigene” as criteria for a minister from
each state in the President’s cabinet, it does not define the word, nor does Nigerian law
contain a definition. Human Rights Watch officials were told by a Hausa civil society
figure “indigene and non-indigene is a distinction used to manipulate the mind of the
people and drag them into crisis, just like religion and ethnicity” (HRW, 2006, p. 34). In
addition, Nigerians who do not possess a certificate of indigeneity cannot obtain federal
service employment or compete for any of the many other appointments that are
allocated, such as state and local government, recruitment into federal police forces or
education at a military academy (HRW, 2006). As local, state and even the federal
government uphold these policies and practices or ignore the complaints, they are
perpetuating a system that the people will continue to follow.
The issue of indigeneity comes about as a way “for communities to keep land
within the hands of their own group—a goal that is controversial but important to many
Nigerians whose ethnic identity is tied to a small geographic area” (HRW, 2006, p. 10).
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Furthermore, as there are a variety of ethnic groups, these Nigerian communities use the
distinction between indigenes and non-indigenes as a way of “demarcating the
boundaries between people who are eligible to hold chieftaincy titles in a particular place,
and participate in traditional institutions of governance more generally (HRW, 2006, p.
10). This also leads to barriers to political participation as non-indigenes are sometimes
intimidated not to vote in the communities in which they live (HRW, 2006).
Examples of discrimination of the non-indigene people can be seen with the
provisioning of services such as healthcare, schools and even admission to universities
(HRW, 2006). Furthermore, the discrimination endured by non-indigenes such as the
Hausa and Jarawa “is especially harmful because many of them cannot trace their origins
back to any other place where they might be able to claim indigene status” (HRW, 2006,
p. 37).
Although there had been previous occurrences of violent conflict between the
Nigerian security forces and Nigerian civilians, the events that took place the last few
days of November serve to highlight the severity of the issue.
During this event, the Nigerian security forces had first responded to attacks by
young Christians and Muslims on homes, businesses and religious establishments (HRW,
July 2009). This event followed allegations put forth by the opposition candidates, Atiku
Abubakr and Muhammadu Buhari, that the People’s Democratic Party had rigged the
election results (Al Jazeera, 2008). There is no clear evidence as to what exactly sparked
this particular event
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Indicator Variables

In this case study, six out of the six indicator variables are present, the only case
study for this to happen (See APPENDIX E: NIGERIA’S INDICATOR VARIABLES).
Although it contains all the indicator variables, this case study does not meet the
definition of genocide put forth by Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) as the state has not
conveyed that it intends to destroy the indigenes based on their group membership; so far,
they are upholding discriminatory policies and not punishing those who have killed nonindigenes arbitrarily.
The first indicator variable present is Government, under the Most Likely row (1a
and 2a). Since Nigeria only gained its independence in 1960, it is still a relatively new
democracy (US Department of State, Nigeria, 2009). Furthermore, the state has
experience periods of military rule that have also hindered its democratic development
(US Department of State, Nigeria, 2009). Nigeria is also an unconsolidated democracy as
cited by Linz and Stepan (1996) where behaviorally it cannot be a democracy until “no
significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant
resources attempting to achieve their objective by creating nondemocratic regimes or by
seceding from the state” (p. 16). Nigeria contains characteristics that span both the Most
Likely row and the Likely row for this indicator variable.
Another characteristic present under this indicator variable is the lack of checks
and balances. The last election, in 2007, in which Umaru Yar’Adua of the ruling People’s
Democratic Party (PDP) won the presidency, amid condemnations of vote rigging by
local and international observers. In addition, there is strong evidence for the lack of
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government accountability as government agents who have escaped punishment or
redress for their actions have committed extrajudicial killings, such as those caught on
tape from 2008.
The Leaders/Elites indicator variable (2b) is also active in this case, where
President Umaru Yar’Adua is a destructive leader. He himself is not advocating an
exclusionary ideology but he is not a representative of the people given the fraudulent
elections, so it seemed more appropriate to place this indicator variable in the Likely row.
This is represented by his continued upholding of documents to prove indigene status in
many different aspects of daily life in Nigeria.
According to Padilla et al. (2007), “the effects of destructive leadership are seen
in organization outcomes that compromise the quality of life for constituents (whether
internal or external to the organization) and detract from their main purpose” (p.179).
Due to the fact that many non-indigenes cannot apply for federal jobs and even nonindigene public schools are allocated less money, this detracts from the quality of life for
his constituents.
The soldiers who uphold the exclusionary ideology of discrimination based on
indigene and non-indigene status support the Followers indicator variable (1c) for this
case. Supporting evidence of this can be seen from a specific even in November 2008
where the Plateau state governor, Jonah Jong, issued a “shoot-on-site” order to the
Nigerian Security Forces (HRW, 2009, Arbitrary Killings by Security Forces). While
responding to the mob that had formed after the contested elections, Nigeria security
forces were witnessed killing members of the Boko Haram, an Islamist group, without
provocation (HRW, 2009). While much of the report compiled by Human Rights Watch,
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Arbitrary Killings by security forces could be written off as unreliable eyewitness
accounts, new evidence has surfaced.
Groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have been
reporting extrajudicial killings of Boko Haram for the last few months. What has sparked
the most recent outcry was the video published by Al Jazeera, which clearly showed
unarmed Nigerians being taunted and ridiculed by Nigerian soldiers before they are
executed (Al Jazeera, 2010). Furthermore, the footage took place seven months ago, yet
the Nigerian government has not yet begun investigation into what happened (Al Jazeera,
2010). This kind of targeting of an outsider group with impunity with or without
government authority could spread from the Nigerian security forces to the rest of the
population who share similar views.
The Non-Followers indicator variable (2d) in this case study is present where
there are many people in this state who are unorganized and comply with the government
and the Nigerian security forces out of fear. They are the people who try to minimize the
consequences of not going along with the authorities. This is also the second indicator
variable that is present in the Likely row, which could indicate that more or less, they are
not denying what is going on nor are they completely unaware of the violence between
the indigenes and non-indigenes.
The Outsider Group (1e) here is the non-indigenes where they are considered
separate from the rest of the population who are indigenes and able to prove that they
originated from Nigeria. There is overwhelming evidence of the discrimination against
this group as they are prevented from federal jobs, healthcare and even schools based on
this heritage status.
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Furthermore, by having to prove their area of origin, they are ultimately being
excluded from political participation in the government. Given that the people who make
up the outsider group are civilians, this supports the defenseless characteristic under this
indicator variable. There are similarities between this discrimination and the persecution
that slowly began before the Holocaust.
Moreover, another point of contention between the indigenes and non-indigenes is
the fact that most non-indigenes are Muslim while the indigenes are predominately
Christian (HRW, 2006). This is exacerbated by poor economic conditions in Northern
Nigeria, which is primary Muslim (The Economist, 2010). In addition, many Christian
and indigene Nigerians feel threatened by the Muslim and non-indigenes, as the
conspicuous Boko Haram group has made it abundantly clear that they would like to see
Sharia law spread from the twelve states that have adopted it in the north to the rest of
Nigeria (The Economist, 2010). Also, non-indigenes “who demand equal citizenship
rights are often accused by indigene community leaders of conspiring to reestablish
dominion over the current indigene people of the state” (HRW, 2006, p. 44). Lastly,
although non-indigenes are able to vote in their communities, they still face limited
political participation (2e), as they are often intimidated outright should they want to
participate in local politics (HRW, 2006). This evidence clearly shows that the nonindigenes are a perceived threat by many Nigerians as well as spanning both the Most
Likely row and Likely row.
Lastly, the Environment indicator variable (1f) is present and shows that political
instability, as defined by Alesina et al. (1996), from the recent presidential election as
well as President Umaru Yar’Adua’s absence from the public due to seeking treatment
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for a heart condition in Saudi Arabia, have sent the state into turmoil (BBC, 2010).
Furthermore, there is widespread discrimination, and minority rights are only protected as
a formality in the constitution. This indicator variable belongs in the Most Likely row due
to the fact that everyone is not seen as equal before the law in terms of access to
education and jobs. The issue here is not a question of citizenship but of heritage,
suggestive of the Holocaust where family trees were scoured to confirm or deny any
Jewish heritage.

Discussion

Even though this case study does not meet the definitional criteria set forth to
determine a genocide, this case could easily become so should the government decide to
let the security forces kill indiscriminately if another riot were to happen. Many of the
victims of the security forces may have been rioters, but first they were defenseless
civilians, whether they were part of an extremist group or not. Also, this case contained
all of the indicator variables, not necessarily along the entire Most Likely row, but should
the destructive leader begin advocating an exclusionary ideology and an ideology of hate,
Nigeria could hastily develop into a genocide.
Nigeria appears to be a Most Likely case of genocide where it would take a leader
to give the people the approval to kill those in the outsider group, given that they are
already perceived as different from the rest of the population and have been blocked from
many different areas of life due to their inability to prove their heritage. What is not clear
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is how much the followers and non-followers would need to be convinced that
discrimination is not enough and extermination of the non-indigenes is the answer.
A possible scenario for this might stem from an event that supports historical
perceptions of threat from this group where the rest of the Nigerians either support and
actively participate in the killings or many do nothing to stop them from happening. As
historical evidence, there was widespread discrimination against the Jews and other nonAryans before the mass exterminations began. There was a buildup of propaganda to
support the perceptions of threat to the Aryan population from the target groups as well
as to convince the German people that if they were not helping to rid Germany of these
unwanted groups, they should at least not prevent other from carrying out their orders.
Either this kind of propaganda or the widespread presence of conformers, who will not
protest the actions of the security forces, would help to bring this case study into
becoming a genocide.
This case study has all of the key characteristics that other genocides have
contained and it would be a gross error for the international community to ignore these
warning flags, as they are glaringly apparent according to this measure that Nigerian
could swiftly become a genocide.
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CHAPTER FIVE: YEMEN

Overview of the Conflict

Islam arrived in Yemen after a period of Persian rule in 628 A.D. (Yemen, 2008).
The Rassite dynasty, imams of the Zaidi sect, came to power and built a theocratic
political structure that persisted until just before independence in 1962 (Yemen, 2008).
By 1520, Yemen had become a part of the Ottoman Empire, and was later occupied by
Turkey until northern Yemen gained independence in 1918 (Yemen, 2009). The British
Empire occupied a port in southern Yemen, called Aden, in 1839, and held it and its
surrounding areas as a protectorate until southern Yemen achieved independence in 1967
(Yemen, 2009). After the fall of the Ottoman empire, Imam Yahya ruled northern Yemen
as a theocracy which led to a rise in dissatisfaction and the assassination of Imam Yahya
in 1948 (Yemen, 2008).
Two crown princes succeeded Imam Yahya, and the last, Imam Muhammad alBadr, was deposed by a revolt of pro-Egyptian army forces (Yemen, 2008). He tried to
rally support from royalist but Colonel Adallah al-Salal, of the army, proclaimed a
republic and Yemen became embroiled in war as Egypt supported the republicans and
Saudi Arabia and Jordan the royalists (Yemen, 2008). Al-Salal’s government was
“overthrown while he was abroad, and a three-man republican council was formed with
Qadi Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani (one of the anti-Egyptian leaders) as chairman” (Yemen,
2008, para. 10) and Hassan al-Amri, who had been Premier before al-Salal, resumed his
position (Yemen, 2008). Saudi Arabia officially recognized the republic in 1970, having
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stopped supporting the royalists and removing its troops from the area earlier in 1967
(Yemen, 2008).
At the same time, most of southern Yemen had been under British rule since
1839, and it was not until 1967 that Britain withdrew, leaving the Marxist National
Liberation Front (NLF) and the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen to
both fight for power in the newly founded People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen
(South Yemen) (Yemen, 2009). The NLF won and assumed power as a left-wing
government; this resulted in a mass of people fleeing into north Yemen where the regime
was more moderate (Yemen, 2009). The influx of people resulted in skirmishes between
mercenaries from northern Yemen and the south Yemen government, with war breaking
out in 1972 (Yemen, 2009). The Arab league helped to arrange a ceasefire that same year
and both countries signed an agreement to unite but it did not happen until years later
(Yemen, 2009). In 1977, after the assassination of pro-Saudi colonel Ibrahim al-Hamadi,
Colonel Ahmed ibn Hussein al-Ghashmi, another member of the Military Command
Council, took his place (Yemen, 2009). Under al-Ghashmi, there was a movement
towards a more constitutional form of government and he was installed as president after
the dissolution of the Military Command Council (Yemen, 2009). Al-Ghashmi was killed
by a car bomb in 1978 and Colonel Ali Abdullah Saleh succeeded as president of north
Yemen, with Ali Nasser Muhammad as president of south Yemen (Yemen, 2009).
Border disputes between north and south Yemen sparked again in 1979 but the
Arab League was once again able to step in and arrange a ceasefire with an agreement for
two countries to united (Yemen, 2009). This second agreement led to definite progress
“so that by 1983 a joint Yemen council was meeting at six-monthly intervals, and in
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March 1984 a joint committee on foreign policy sat for the first time in Aden” (Yemen,
2009, para. 9). The unifying agreement was not actually signed until April of 1990
(International Crisis Group, 2003). The agreement provided for a five-member
presidential council (three northerners, two southerners), chaired by President Saleh
(International Crisis Group, 2003).
President Saleh was re-elected in both the 1983 and 1988 elections after his
succession as president in 1978 (Yemen, 2009). On May 22 of 1990, the two Yemens
were officially merged, with President Saleh leader of a unified Yemen, and Sana as the
nation's capital (Yemen, 2008). By 1993, relations between the north and south began to
sour and fighting between the northern and southern armies erupted into a civil war in
1994 between southern secessionists and Yemen's northern-based government (Yemen,
2008). The war was very brief and won by northern forces, where then Saleh was
officially elected by parliament as president of the country, and a coalition government
that excluded the leading southern party was established (Yemen, 2008).
He has worked over the years to consolidate his power through such institutions
as a Consultative Council, whose members are appointed by the president and are there to
advise him (International Crisis Group, 2003). In addition, President Saleh is still in
power today; “he won the first-ever direct presidential elections in 1999 with more than
96% of the vote, the main opposition party, which was barred from fielding a candidate,
described the poll as a sham” (BBC, Yemen, 2010, para. 12).
The current ongoing conflict revolves around the violence between the Houthis,
calling themselves Believing Youth, and the Yemeni government (Hiltermann, 2009).
The Houthis belong to a specific branch of Shia Islam, called Zaydism (Hiltermann,
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2009). This group set up schools teaching Zaydi doctrine to counter the weakening of its
influence on the people and the Yemeni government originally supported them (HRW,
October 2008). Although they have never issued clear demands to the Yemeni
government, this group has made sure the government knows that it is critical of the
government’s support of the United States in the war on terror as well as protesting the
repression of Zaydi revivalists and acts of state repression (Hiltermann, 2009). The Zaydi
Imam had ruled in Yemen for over a thousand years before the revolution in 1962 (HRW,
2008). Even though President Saleh himself is a Zaydi, he has publically portrayed the
Believing Youth “as a fundamentalist group out to subvert the state and restore the Zaydi
imamate” (Reuters, 2010).

Figure 3 Map of Yemen
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Moreover, most of the fighting has taken place in the northern Sa’da governate,
which borders Saudi Arabia (HRW, November 2008). It originally started when the
government arrested over 800 Houthi members who would not cease chanting “Death to
America” (Scardina, 2009). President Saleh felt that they might turn on him next so he
wanted to have their leader, Hussein al-Houthi, arrested and a clash between his
supporters and government forces ensued (Scardina, 2009). The government continues to
accuse the rebels of trying to “install an Islamic Imamate government based on Zaydi
doctrine…it has described the group as ‘extremist,’ ‘terrorist,’ and ‘backward’ …the alHouthis, meanwhile, say they have been defending themselves from a ‘dictatorial, corrupt
power’ that had tried to ‘eliminate their doctrine’” (Scardina, 2009, para. 13-14).

Indicator Variables

Unlike the previous two case studies, Yemen meets the definitional criteria of a
genocide. This is primarily due to the fact that the Yemeni government intends to destroy
the Houthi group; it recognizes them as a threat to Yemen national security. Implications
of this finding will be in the discussion section.
The first indicator variable is Government (2a) because Yemen gained its
independence from Britain in 1967 (Globalsecurity.org, 2009) (See APPENDIX F:
YEMEN’S INDICATOR VARIABLESAPPENDIX F: YEMEN’S INDICATOR
VARIABLES). In addition, the State of Yemen known today was united in 1990,
making it a new and unconsolidated democracy (Globalsecurity.org, 2009). Specifically,
Yemen does not behave like a consolidated where “no significant national, social,
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economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to
achieve their objective by creating nondemocratic regimes or by seceding from the state,”
(Linz and Stepan, 1996, p. 16) due to the fact that President Saleh has been in power
since 1978 and does not seem keen on relinquishing it.
The second indicator variable is that of Leader(s)/Elites (2b), where President
Saleh is a destructive leader as he has been in power for over thirty years, with the last
election being held in 2006 (New York Times, 2006). This shows that he has been
controlling and coercing his constituents into concentrating on his goals instead of their
needs as well as the fact that he does not represent the people of Yemen given his long
stay in power. In addition, President Saleh, as a destructive leader has a personalized
need for power and focuses on his goals instead of his constituents. This is supported by
his attempts to consolidate his power by establishing institutions that strengthened both
the state and his own position as President of Yemen (International Crisis Group, 2003).
Although President Saleh has been in office for over thirty years, there is still a
presence of other political parties, such as (Library of Congress, August 2008). This
supports the Non-Followers/ Bystanders indicator variable (2d).
There is also the presence of an Outsider Group indicator variable (2e). The
Houthis, as they have been ostracized for belonging to another branch of Islam. In
addition, they are portrayed as a threat to the rest of the people of Yemen and the Yemeni
government. This is due to allegations by different parts of the government claiming that
their goal is to reinstate the Zaydi imamate that had been overthrown in a coup in 1962
(BBC, 9/17/2009). Whether this is true or not, this shows the existence of an outsider
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group being considered a threat. The Houthis are an armed rebel group so there is no
evidence that they are defenseless.

Discussion

Although the Yemen case study meets the definitional criteria for genocide, it is
not a genocide according the Genocide Conceptual Framework used to analyze the case
studies. The Yemen government does intend to destroy the Houthi rebel group to the
extent that they want to eliminate it as a threat to national security.
This case study is vastly different from the previous. Primarily, the outsider group
is not defenseless and although they do not have the same arms capabilities as the
Yemeni government, they are able to show resistance and fight against the government.
In other genocides such as Rwanda and the Holocaust, the groups who were targeted
were civilians who had no means of defending themselves from attacks from the
government.
Shaw (2007) supports this point when he states that “only by distinguishing
‘sovereigns and armies’ from ‘subjects and civilians’ could genocide be delimited from
war” (p.463). In addition, Eck and Hultman (2007) state that one-sided violence consists
of “civilians that are deliberately and directly targeted by government or non-state
groups” (p. 235). Although, Eck and Hultman consider genocide as part of one-sided
violence, their research has contribute to adding “civilian” status is part of what makes
genocide different from war.
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CHAPTER SIX: ETHIOPIA

Overview of the Conflict

This case study deals with the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, also known as the
Somali Regional State (Human Rights Watch, June 2008).

Figure 4 Map of Ethiopia

The Ogaden region of Ethiopia is home to ethnic Somalis who are largely
pastoralists and almost entirely Muslim (HRW, June 2008). As one of Ethiopia’s poorest
states it is also deeply divided by clan, political, ideological, and resource-based tensions
(HRW, June 2008). All the major Somali clans are found in this region and the Darood
Ogaadeen clan is estimated to be the largest single clan, comprising 40 to 50 percent of
Ethiopian Somalis (HRW, June 2008).
Prior to Italy’s invasion in 1936, Ethiopia’s was ruled by Emperor Haile Selassie
(HRW, June 2008). Italy’s occupation only lasted about five years when British and
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Ethiopian forces defeated the Italians and returned the emperor to the throne (US
Department of State, Ethiopia, 2009). In addition, this part of Ethiopia once belonged to
Somalia but was restored to Ethiopian sovereignty in 1948 (HRW, 2009). In 1974, the
emperor was removed from office and replaced by the Derg, a provisional administrative
council of soldiers (US Department of State, Ethiopia, 2009). Lieutenant Colonel
Mengistu Haile Mariam assumed power as the head of state in 1975 and with financial
support from the Soviet Union his totalitarian-style government was able to militarize the
country (US Department of State, Ethiopia, 2009).
In 1976, the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), based on Mogadishu and
Hargeysa in Somalia, was established by Somali clan elders with the help of Somalia’s
president Siad Barre (HRW, June 2008). The WSLF recruited frustrated Ogaadeenis who
had suffered at the hands of the Ethiopian government (HRW, June 2008). In 1977,
Somalia increased its support of the rebel groups fighting in Ogaden and launched a fullscale invasion, which achieved to take control of most of the Southern part of Ogaden
(HRW, June 2008). After the invasion, the Soviet Union and Cuba intervened on behalf
of Ethiopia and crushed the Somali military, driving them out of the Ogaden territory
(HRW, June 2008).
In 1989, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), an Ethiopian insurgent
group, merged with other ethnically based opposition movements to form the Ethiopian
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) (US Department of State, Ethiopia,
2009). When the Derg collapsed due to instability within the country, Mengistu was run
out of office. The EPRDF and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) then established the
Transitional Government of Ethiopia (US Department of State, Ethiopia, 2009). Under
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this government, a system of “ethnic federalism” was instituted, which was based on
ethnic and linguistics distinctions (HRW, June 2008).
The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) had broken away from the
Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) in 1984 (HRW, June 2008). After the
Transitional Government delegated the Somali Region some autonomy with its own
president and Parliament, the ONLF began to assert greater demands for Ogaden selfdetermination (HRW, June 2008). The Ethiopian government responded by supporting
non-Ogaadeeni clans and politicians and this was seen by the clans as “unwarranted
central interference in their regional affairs and political issues” by the central
government (HRW, June 2008, p. 22). In 1994, the ONLF dominated regional assembly
“triggered a confrontation with the central EPRDF government by voting to exercise the
‘right to self-determination’” (HRW, June 2008, p. 22). The EPRDF removed the
regional president and deputies and replaced them with an EPRDF affiliated party, the
Ethiopian Somali Democratic League (ESDL), which was formed by 10 non-Ogaadeeni
political parties (HRW, June 2008). After governing for almost four years, the ESDL
gave way to a new party in 1998, the Somali People’s Democratic Party (SPDP), which
was a merger of EDL and a splinter group of the ONLF (HRW, June 2008). Similar to
other groups that have been in power, this party has been accused of corruption and
incompetence (HRW, June 2008).
Since 1994, the central Ethiopian government has maintained the administrative
structures established under Mengistu’s Derg government to ensure tight control over the
population (HRW, June 2008). This includes the strong presence of security and military
forces in the area as well as the EPRDF policy of appointing a parallel system of
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government-paid elders at each administrative level and this is viewed by many “as proof
of the government’s intent to extend its authority over communities at every opportunity
in the interest of maintaining security” (HRW, June 2008, p. 25).
The ONLF increased its targeting of representatives and administrators in the
Somali Region as well as military convoys in 2007 (HRW, June 2008). In April of 2007,
the ONLF attacked a Chinese-run oil exploration field (Gettleman, 2007). The ONLF
issued a statement where they urged, “all international oil companies to refrain from
entering into agreements with the Ethiopian government as it is not in effective control of
the Ogaden” (Gettleman, 2007, para. 15). In June 2007, the Ethiopian government
launched a counterinsurgency military campaign against the ONLF where the Ethiopian
forces tried to “relocate, terrorize, and punish communities in areas of ONLF operation or
perceived to support the insurgency, using various abusive strategies” (HRW, June 2008,
p. 31-32). The methods they used ranged from forced “relocations of civilians,
destruction of their villages, willful killings, and summary executions, and torture, rape
and other forms of sexual violence” (HRW, June 2008, p. 33). The Ethiopian soldiers
also have resorted to tracing ONLF visits to various villages and pressured the relatives
and elders to give up the ONLF members (HRW, June 2008). If the villages did not
comply, many were detained or killed (HRW, June 2008). Sometimes villages were also
detained or killed because the soldiers arbitrarily decided they were ONLF supporters or
members (HRW, June 2008). The ONLF has also been responsible for killing civilians,
including government officials and others who they suspected may be supporting the
government (HRW, June 2008).
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Indicator Variables

The first indicator variable present is the Government variable (2a) as Ethiopia
only became a federal republic in 1994, and is therefore a new democracy (US
Department of State, Ethiopia 2010) (See APPENDIX G: ETHIOPIA’S INDICATOR
VARIABLES). In addition, there is evidence that Ethiopia lacks the checks and balances
as well as the government accountability needed to be a strongly consolidated
democracy. This is supported by the fact that Meles Zenawi, who is a member of the
Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary
Democratic Front chairman (EPRDF), he is also the prime minister, who holds most of
the executive power (Biles, 2005). Furthermore, he won reelection in the bitterly
contested election in 2005, despite a wave of support for the opposition (BBC, February
2010). As part of the EPRDF, he has continued to uphold policies that have segregate and
persecuted people in the Ogaden region.
The Followers indicator variable is not supported in this case due to the fact that
the government is not advocating the destruction of the Ogaden people. By targeting
civilians for murder for their Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) affiliation, real
or imagined, the Ethiopian military is targeting based on membership affiliation but it
does not seem to support an exclusionary ideology. In addition, the NonFollower/Bystanders indicator variable supported by the presence of other political
parties, such as the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) and the Oromo People’s
Congress (OPC) (US Department of State, Ethiopia, 2009).

75

The Outsider Group indicator variable (2e) for this case study consists of any
Ogaden person with ONLF affiliations. The membership of this group has been
determined by the Ethiopian government, and as they are part of the group that is fighting
for autonomy, it means they are a threat to the national security of Ethiopia. Most of the
members of this group are defenseless civilians who may or may not actually support the
ONLF (HRW, June 2008). Furthermore, they have limited participation in government as
the ONLF was considered a political group by the government, which changed once they
began to voice their demands for autonomy for the Somali region (HRW, June 2008).
Their seats in the regional government were also taken away and given to EPRDF
members and affiliated parties (HRW, June 2008).

Discussion

Ethiopia is another case study that does not meet the definitional criteria of a
genocide according to the definition put forth by Chalk and Jonassohn by which genocide
is “a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy
a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator” (Chalk and
Jonassohn, 1990, p. 15). The intent of the Ethiopian government to destroy the outsider
group for this case is not clear.
This case study also contains three out of the six indicator variables. Unlike the
previous three case studies, Ethiopia does not contain the Environment indicator variable.
The chance for political instability may arise around the upcoming elections in May
2010, but the roots of the conflict stem from the fight over the Ogaden territory. Overall,

76

this is a likely case of genocide given the government’s actions of targeting civilians
based on their group affiliation.
This case study also brings up some interesting questions for genocide studies,
such as implications for defenseless civilians being targeted for the actions of rebel
groups. The ONLF started out as a political party and only changed into a rebel group
once they began to voice demands for independence. The government is using civilians
as proxies, or “collective punishment” (HRW, June 208), for the actions of the ONLF.
This brings up the question of whether a civil war can turn into a genocide only once
civilians are targeted for possible affiliation to a warring faction. Eck and Hultman (2007)
have studied this and found that the majority of attacks on civilians occur during armed
conflicts in a state. Also, even though the ONLF also committed attacks on civilians, Eck
and Hultman’s data also showed that 89% of one-sided violence was perpetrated by the
government. This shows that the government is still the lead perpetrator in attacks on
civilians.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

The results of this analysis have yielded numerous findings for the study of
genocide as well as significance for scholars and policy makers. The implications of each
case study will be discussed as they apply to the research question. The main research
question of this paper was to see what set of specific relationships or indicators are
needed for a case of violent conflict to be classified as a genocide.
Kenya was included in this analysis due to the extreme polarization of its ethnic
groups after its presidential election in 2007. Previous research has suggested that this
kind of ethnic polarization has been a large contributing factor in past genocides.
Although, it contained four out of six indicator variables, Government, NonFollowers/Bystanders, Outsider Group, Environment, all in the Likely row, Kenya at this
time is not a genocide because the violence is not state sponsored.
The killings that are taking place are between the two most prominent ethnic
groups, the Kikuyus and the Luo. The Luo ethnic group has targeted the Kikuyus for
killing as they felt that the 2007 elections were rigged, and their candidate Odinga
actually won. The interesting aspect of this case is that the Kikuyus are considered the
most powerful ethnic group as they inherited the resources left by the British colonizers.
There has not been a case of genocide where the outsider group being targeted has been
in the elite hierarchy of state. The possible scenario for this to turn into a genocide would
be for President Kibaki to begin to suppress the Luo and its aligned ethnic groups by
eliminating them as a threat to his legitimacy. It seems for this to happen, he would have
to begin to advocate an exclusionary ideology against the Luo and convince the other
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Kenyan people that this is the only way to eliminate the Luo as a threat. Another
possibility is that the Luo could garner enough support from the rest of the ethnic groups
who feel slighted at Odinga’s loss and once in power, they could begin to target the
Kikuyu in retaliation. For this case to become a genocide, the government would have to
sponsor the targeted killings of a selected ethnic group.
The second case study, Nigeria, contained all six indicator variables, four of them
ranging into the Most Likely row. The most pivotal factor for this case study to be
considered a genocide is that most of the victims of extrajudicial killings as well as
periodic massacres are considered non-indigenes, as they cannot prove their family
origins in Nigeria. In addition, the killings are being performed by the Nigerian security
forces, on the authority of the government. They are the active participants in the
exclusionary ideology as the government has not taken any steps to remove indigene
qualifications from many aspects of Nigerian life. The Nigerian security forces have also
escaped punishment for whatever murders they have committed, supporting the lack of
government accountability.
The most important piece of evidence found from this case analysis comes from
the fact that the outsider group here is composed of civilians. They are not engaged in
violence with the government’s forces nor are they treated with the same rights as the
indigenes.
It is not within the scope of this measure to predict the magnitude or severity of
killings needed for this case to begin to look a “classic” example of what a genocide has
looked like. The evidence is clear that this case is most likely to become a genocide if the
killings do continue without intervention or government accountability.
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Yemen, the third case study, met the genocide definition employed throughout
this paper. The only stipulation was that the group the government has intended to
destroy is an armed rebel group. This gives the government legitimacy to wage a war
since it would be considered a civil war. They are genuinely a threat to Yemeni national
interest but as an armed rebel, this case cannot be considered a likely genocide, even
though it contains four out of six indicator variables. This case study supports recent
research that the missing aspect of genocide studies is that the target group must be
civilians.
The last case study, Ethiopia, contains similarities to the Yemen case study. Here,
the ethnic Somalis of the Ogaden region have asserted their quest for independence from
the Ethiopian government who has contained tight control over the area since
independence. Given that people of the Ogaden region have been pursuing independence,
the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) has emerged as an armed rebel group
asserting the demands of the Ogaadeeni people.
What makes this case different from Yemen is that the government has decided to
target the civilian populations for any real or perceived affiliation with the ONLF. They
have used methods ranging from rape to murder to terrorize the civilian population into
giving up members of the ONLF. This is perhaps the most interesting of all the case
studies and the most thought provoking. For this analysis, this case has been classified as
a likely case of genocide. While civilians are being targeted for group affiliation by the
government, it does not contain an a exclusionary ideology, meaning a “belief system
that identifies some overriding purpose or principle that justifies efforts to restrict,
persecute, or eliminate certain categories of people” (Harff, 2003, p. 63). This lack of an
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exclusionary ideology seems to come from the supposition that the ONLF and its
possible civilian affiliates are only being targeted as a threat to the national interest of the
state. Should the Ogaadeeni people give up their demands for autonomy, it seems likely
that the government would stop its attacks. Furthermore, there was no evidence found in
this case to suggest that the Ethiopian government intends to destroy the Ogaden people,
either the civilians or rebel groups.
This case study brings in questions of how far does the government have to go for
intent to be established when there is the involvement of an insurgent group, which
clouds the civilians/armed combatants delineation. This case also supports previous
research assertions that genocide usually happens in the course of wars or even civil wars
and rebellion (See Shaw. 2009).
The four case studies examined for this paper do not bring enough evidence to
fully support or dismiss the validity of the measure. Part of this comes from the numerous
other variables such as the presence of insurgent or rebel groups that scholars have not
researched before in connection with genocide. The most solid evidence from this
analysis is that the outsider group must contain civilians because without it, the case is
only a civil war. Nigeria was classified as a genocide and it contained all six indicator
variables, although not all of them were present in the Most Likely category. The other
case studies lacked the intent or the civilian aspect that previous research has supported
as key to a genocide. It seems it would take another case similar to Nigeria to see how
many indicator variables are present and distributed among the Likely and Most Likely
rows.
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Case Study Indicator Variables Comparison
Government

Kenya

Nigeria

Yemen

Ethiopia

Leaders/Elites

Non-Followers/
Outsider Group
Bystanders

Followers

• Unconsolidated
democracy
• No government
accountability
• No checks or balances
• People have limited
rights
• Unconsolidated
democracy
• No government
accountability
• New Democracy

• Destructive
• Does not represent
the people
• (Present in Likely row)

• Unconsolidated
democracy
• No government
accountability

• Destructive
• Does not represent
the people

• Colluders-active
participants in
exclusionary ideology

• Unconsolidated
democracy
• Limited checks or
balances
• New democracy

• Presence of other
political parties

• Considered an “out”
group
• Considered a threat
• Defenseless

• Political Instability

• Conformersunorganized and
unaware
• (Present in Likely row)

• Considered an “out”
group
• Limited participation in
government
• Considered a threat
• Defenseless

• Political instability
• Minorities have no
government
protection

• Presence of other
political parties

• Considered an “out”
group
• Considered a threat
• Considered an “out”
group
• Limited participation in
government
• Defenseless

Figure 5 Case Study Indicator Variable Comparison
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Environment

Figure 5, Case Study Indicator Variable Comparison, gives a clear depiction of
how the case studies analyzed in this paper compare to each other. Beginning with the
Government indicator variable, it is present in all four cases analyzed. More specifically,
this thesis found that all four cases were unconsolidated democracies with no government
accountability or limited checks or balances. In addition, the Outsider Group variable
was also present in all four case studies, suggesting that all four are potential genocides.
After the analysis, Nigeria, was found to be most likely to become a genocide.
The Followers variable was only present in the case of Nigeria. At first glance,
this may seem to be significant but upon closer inspection of the case studies, one would
see that this is because of the presence of an exclusionary ideology, which specifically
advocates the targeting of a group. This variable cannot be present without an
exclusionary ideology.
Although Yemen and Ethiopia were very similar cases in that they both had rebel
groups that were being targeted by the government, it is interesting that Yemen contained
two more indicator variables. This is intriguing because Ethiopia contains one of the most
important aspects of genocide, the target group is composed of civilians, yet it has half
the indicator variables that Yemen contains. This seems to demonstrate that it is not how
many indicator variables are present, but which ones.
One of the weaknesses of this conceptual framework used in this paper is that
“intent” is not an indicator variable; it is only included in whether there is an
exclusionary ideology or not. This may be corrected by reorganizing the framework to
include exclusionary ideology under the Environment indicator variable but further
testing of the model is needed.
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Establishing intent and the civilian aspect are what really distinguish genocide
from other forms of organized violence. Given that from the case studies analyzed both
these indicators were only present in one may very well show that genocide in its pure
form is actually rare. Only by testing more case studies with this measure, would one be
able to see whether it actually predicts the likelihood of genocide given the indicator
variables present.
Like the concept of sovereignty, genocide may be more fluid in a real world
context. In addition, with the prevalence of other actors and the speed with which
information travels around the world now, genocides in the sense that the government
intends to destroy a civilian group may not actually happen anymore. It seems that
research needs to turn from trying to define genocide in a classical sense to seeing how
“limited-genocides,” in which a state or other authority intentionally targets civilians for
murder based on their group membership, as defined by the perpetrator, may better apply
to the present international arena. Here, the differences between this definition and the
United Nations definition are: 1) the intention may not be to destroy the group; and 2) the
specific targeting of a civilian group.
As an early warning model, this analysis has shown that Nigeria is most likely to
turn into a genocide but only time will be to see if this comes as an end result. The model
predicts that both Kenya and Ethiopia are likely cases of genocide should other indicator
variables become present. This model is still too far into its infancy to be able to
determine how strong it is compared to the model created by Barbara Harff but further
research may yield intriguing results.
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The entire purpose behind genocide early warning models is to be able to predict
whether a case of organized violence may or may not turn into a genocide. An early
warning model is developed with the express rationale of being used as a justification for
early humanitarian intervention to reduce the loss of lives from state sponsored
massacres. This is also significant for policy makers as a stronger early warning system
would mean a better justification for humanitarian intervention before death tolls reach
that tacit threshold that finally spurs the international community to act or, at the very
least, to begin calling, or labeling the violence a “genocide.” If humanitarian intervention
fails or does not happen with a case of genocide, it is then up to the international
community to be able to prosecute the perpetrator or perpetrators based on indicators that
have been determined to comprise a genocide.
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No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust?
Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder Since 1955
Adapted from the Genocide Risk Assessment Model by Barbara Harff (2003)

Political
Upheaval

Prior Genocides

The Necessary Preconditions for
Genocide and Politicide
Political Upheaval is defined as "an
abrupt change in the political
community caused by the formation fof
a state or regime through violent
conflict, redrawing of state boundaries,
or defeat in international war" (p. 62)

Habituation to Mass Killings?
"10 countries had multiple episodes of
genocide/politicide in the last 45 years'"(
p.62)
Exclusionary Ideologies and Autocratic
Rule

Preconditions
for Genocide
and
Politicide:
Variables and
Indicators

Political Systems

Ethnic and
Religous
Cleavages

Low Economic
Development

"Episodes of genocide and politicide
become more likely when the leaders of
regimes and revolutionary movements
articulate an exlusionary ideology, a beliefe
system that identifies some overriding
purpose or principle that justifies eforts to
restrict persecute, or eliminate certain
categories of people" (p.63)
"The greater the ethnic and religious
diversity, the greater the likelihood that
communal identity will lead to mobilization
...discrimination against a communal
(religious or ethnic) minority is likely to
increase the salience of group identity and
its mobilixation for political action" (p. 64)

"The State Failure project has
consistently found that armed conflicts
and adverse regime changes are more
likely to occur in poor countries" (p. 64)
Economic and Political Interdependence

International
Context
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"The greater the degree to which a country is
interdependent with others, the less likely its
leaders are to attempt geno-/politicides. The
converse is that leaders of isolated states are
more likel to calculate that they can eliminate
unwanted groups without international
repercussions" (p. 65)
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Genocide Conceptual Framework—Part 1

Likely

Most Likely

Government
• No checks or balances
• People have limited rights
• Examples:
o Totalitarian
o Authoritarian
o Unconsolidated democracies
o Dictatorships
o Military Juntas
o Failed States
• No government accountability
•
•
•
•

Leader(s)/Elites

1b

1a
• Destructive
• Charismatic
• Does not represent the people
• Exclusionary Ideology

2a

Least Likely

• Colluders
• Active participants in exclusionary
Ideology
• Ideology of hate

• Destructive
o Charismatic
o Personalized need for power
o Narcissism
o Negative life themes
o Ideology of hate
• Does not represent the people
• Exclusionary Ideology

Unconsolidated democracies
Limited checks or balances
New Democracies
No government accountability

• Checks and balances
• Government accountability
• Examples:
• Democracies
• Republics
• Constitutional democracies
• Parliamentary systems

Followers

• Colluders
• Active participants in exclusionary
ideology

2b
• Representative of the people through fair
elections
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2c
• Organized political/social etc groups
recognized and protected by the state
• Political participation permitted

3b

3a

1c

3c

Genocide Conceptual Framework—Part 2

Likely

Most Likely

Non-Followers/Bystanders
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Unorganized
Unaware
In denial
Defenseless
Conformers
As the opposition, not recognized by the
state

Environment

•
•
•
•

1d

Conformers
Unorganized
Unaware
Presence of other political parties

2d
• Organized political/social etc groups
recognized and protected by the state

Least Likely

“Outsider Group”
Unmobilized
Loosely organized
Defenseless
Considered an “out” or “other” group of
people
• Disenfranchised
• Considered a threat
• Considered an “out” or “other” group of
people
• Considered a threat
• Limited participation in government
• Defenseless

• Political Instability
• Perceived outside threats
• Collective culture values
• Minorities have no government
protection

1e
• Political Instability
• Minority rights might have some
government protection

2e

• Organized political/social etc groups
recognized and protected by the state
• Participate in the government

3d

2f
• Organized political/social etc groups
recognized by the state
• Minority rights protected by the
government

3e
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1f

3c

APPENDIX C: THE TOXIC TRIANGLE
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The Toxic triangle: elements in three domains related
to destructive leadership

Destructive Leaders
• Charisma
• Personalized power
• Negative Life themes
• Ideology of hate

Conducive Environment

Susceptible Followers

• Instability
• Perceived threat
• Cultural values
• Lack of checks and
balances and ineffective
institutions

Conformers
Colluders
• Unmet needs
• Ambition
• Low core self- • Similar world
Evaluations
view
• Low maturity • Bad values

Source: Adapted from Padilla, Hogan, and Kaiser (2007)
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Genocide Conceptual Framework—Part 1—Kenya

Likely

Most Likely

Government

• No checks or balances
• People have limited rights
• Examples:
o Totalitarian
o Authoritarian
o Unconsolidated democracies
o Dictatorships
o Military Juntas
o Failed States
• No government accountability
•
•
•
•

Leader(s)/Elites

1b

1a
• Destructive
• Charismatic
• Does not represent the people
• Exclusionary Ideology

• Representative of the people through fair
elections
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2c
• Organized political/social etc groups
recognized and protected by the state
• Political participation permitted

3b

3a

1c
• Colluders
• Active participants in exclusionary
ideology

2b

2a

Least Likely

• Colluders
• Active participants in exclusionary
Ideology
• Ideology of hate

• Destructive
o Charismatic
o Personalized need for power
o Narcissism
o Negative life themes
o Ideology of hate
• Does not represent the people
• Exclusionary Ideology

Unconsolidated democracies
Limited checks or balances
New Democracies
No government accountability

• Checks and balances
• Government accountability
• Examples:
• Democracies
• Republics
• Constitutional democracies
• Parliamentary systems

Followers

3c

Genocide Conceptual Framework—Part 2—Kenya

Most Likely

Non-Followers/Bystanders
•
•
•
•
•
•

“Outsider Group”

•
•
•
•

Unorganized
Unaware
In denial
Defenseless
Conformers
As the opposition, not recognized by the
state

Unmobilized
Loosely organized
Defenseless
Considered an “out” or “other” group of
people
• Disenfranchised
• Considered a threat

Likely

1d
•
•
•
•

• Political Instability
• Perceived outside threats
• Collective culture values
• Minorities have no government
protection

1e

• Considered an “out” or “other” group of
people
• Considered a threat
• Limited participation in government
• Defenseless

Conformers
Unorganized
Unaware
Presence of other political parties

2d

Least Likely

Environment

• Organized political/social etc groups
recognized and protected by the state

1f
• Political Instability
• Minority rights might have some
government protection

2e
• Organized political/social etc groups
recognized and protected by the state
• Participate in the government

• Organized political/social etc groups
recognized by the state
• Minority rights protected by the
government

3e

3d
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2f

3c

APPENDIX E: NIGERIA’S INDICATOR VARIABLES
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Genocide Conceptual Framework—Part 1—Nigeria

Likely

• No checks or balances
• People have limited rights
• Examples:
o Totalitarian
o Authoritarian
o Unconsolidated democracies
o Dictatorships
o Military Juntas
o Failed States
• No government accountability
•
•
•
•

Least Likely

Most Likely

Government

• Checks and balances
• Government accountability
• Examples:
• Democracies
• Republics
• Constitutional democracies
• Parliamentary systems

Leader(s)/Elites

Followers

• Destructive
o Charismatic
o Personalized need for power
o Narcissism
o Negative life themes
o Ideology of hate
• Does not represent the people
• Exclusionary Ideology

1a

• Colluders
• Active participants in exclusionary
Ideology
• Ideology of hate

1b
• Destructive
• Charismatic
• Does not represent the people
• Exclusionary Ideology

Unconsolidated democracies
Limited checks or balances
New Democracies
No government accountability

2a

• Representative of the people through fair
elections

3a

• Colluders
• Active participants in exclusionary
ideology

2b

3b
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1c

2c

• Organized political/social etc groups
recognized and protected by the state
• Political participation permitted

3c

Genocide Conceptual Framework—Part 2—Nigeria

Likely

Most Likely

Non-Followers/Bystanders
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Unorganized
Unaware
In denial
Defenseless
Conformers
As the opposition, not recognized by the
state

“Outsider Group”

Environment

• Unmobilized
• Loosely organized
• Defenseless
• Considered an “out” or “other” group of people
• Disenfranchised
• Considered a threat

1d

2d

Least Likely

• Political Instability
• Minority rights might have some
government protection

2f

2e
• Organized political/social etc groups recognized
and protected by the state
• Participate in the government

• Organized political/social etc groups
recognized and protected by the state

1f

1e
• Considered an “out” or “other” group of people
• Considered a threat
• Limited participation in government
• Defenseless

Conformers
Unorganized
Unaware
Presence of other political parties

• Political Instability
• Perceived outside threats
• Collective culture values
• Minorities have no government
protection

3d

3e
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• Organized political/social etc groups
recognized by the state
• Minority rights protected by the
government

3c

APPENDIX F: YEMEN’S INDICATOR VARIABLES
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Genocide Conceptual Framework—Part 1—Yemen

Least Likely

Likely

Most Likely

Government
• No checks or balances
• People have limited rights
• Examples:
o Totalitarian
o Authoritarian
o Unconsolidated democracies
o Dictatorships
o Military Juntas
o Failed States
• No government accountability
• Unconsolidated democracies
• Limited checks or balances
• New Democracies
• No government accountability
• Checks and balances
• Government accountability
• Examples:
o Democracies
o Republics
o Constitutional democracies
o Parliamentary systems

Leader(s)/Elites

Followers

• Destructive
o Charismatic
o Personalized need for power
o Narcissism
o Negative life themes
o Ideology of hate
• Does not represent the people
• Exclusionary Ideology
1a

2a

•
•
•
•

Destructive
Charismatic
Does not represent the people
Exclusionary Ideology

• Colluders
o Active participants in exclusionary
Ideology
o Ideology of hate

1b

1c

2b

• Colluders
• Active participants in exclusionary
ideology
2c

• Representative of the people through
fair elections

3a

3b
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• Organized political/social etc groups
recognized and protected by the
state
• Political participation permitted

3c

Genocide Conceptual Framework—Part 2—Yemen

Least Likely

Likely

Most Likely

Non-Followers/Bystanders
• Unorganized
• Unaware
• In denial
• Defenseless
• Conformers
• As the opposition, not recognized
by the state

“Outsider Group”

Environment

•
•
•
•

• Political Instability
• Perceived outside threats
• Collective culture values
• Minorities have no government
protection

1d

Unmobilized
Loosely organized
Defenseless
Considered an “out” or “other” group of
people
• Disenfranchised
• Considered a threat
1e

• Political Instability
• Minority rights might have some
government protection

2d

• Considered an “out” or “other” group of
people
• Considered a threat
• Limited participation in government
• Defenseless
2e
• Organized political/social etc groups
recognized and protected by the state
• Participate in the government

• Organized political/social etc
groups recognized by the state
• Minority rights protected by the
government

• Conformers
• Unorganized
• Unaware
• Presence of other political parties

• Organized political/social etc groups
recognized and protected by the state

3d

3e
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1f

2f

3c

APPENDIX G: ETHIOPIA’S INDICATOR VARIABLES
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Genocide Conceptual Framework—Part 1—Ethiopia

Least Likely

Likely

Most Likely

Government

• No checks or balances
• People have limited rights
• Examples:
o Totalitarian
o Authoritarian
o Unconsolidated democracies
o Dictatorships
o Military Juntas
o Failed States
• No government accountability
• Unconsolidated democracies
• Limited checks or balances
• New Democracies
• No government accountability
• Checks and balances
• Government accountability
• Examples:
• Democracies
• Republics
• Constitutional democracies
• Parliamentary systems

Leader(s)/Elites

Followers

• Destructive
o Charismatic
o Personalized need for power
o Narcissism
o Negative life themes
o Ideology of hate
• Does not represent the people
• Exclusionary Ideology
1a

2a

• Destructive
• Charismatic
• Does not represent the people
• Exclusionary Ideology

• Colluders
• Active participants in exclusionary
Ideology
• Ideology of hate

1b

1c

2b

• Colluders
• Active participants in exclusionary
ideology
2c

• Representative of the people through fair
elections

3b

3a
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• Organized political/social etc groups
recognized and protected by the state
• Political participation permitted

3c

Genocide Conceptual Framework—Part 2—Ethiopia

Most Likely

Non-Followers/Bystanders
• Unorganized
• Unaware
• In denial
• Defenseless
• Conformers
• As the opposition, not recognized by the
state

Likely

1d
• Conformers
• Unorganized
• Unaware
• Presence of other political parties

“Outsider Group”

• Unmobilized
• Loosely organized
• Defenseless
• Considered an “out” or “other” group of
people
• Disenfranchised
• Considered a threat
1e

• Political Instability
• Perceived outside threats
• Collective culture values
• Minorities have no government
protection

• Considered an “out” or “other” group of
people
• Considered a threat
• Limited participation in government
• Defenseless

• Political Instability
• Minority rights might have some
government protection

2e

Least Likely

2d
• Organized political/social etc groups
recognized and protected by the state

Environment

• Organized political/social etc groups
recognized and protected by the state
• Participate in the government

3d

2f
• Organized political/social etc groups
recognized by the state
• Minority rights protected by the
government

3e
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1f

3c
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